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“Behind our black faces, behind our armed voice, behind our unnamed name, behind those of us
that you see, behind us is you, behind us are the same simple and ordinary men and women that
are found in all ethnic and racial groups, that paint themselves in all colors, that speak in all
languages, and that live in all places. The same forgotten men and women. The same excluded
people. The same people who are not tolerated. The same people who are persecuted. We are the
same as you. Behind us is you.”
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- Zapatista activist Ana María, Intercontinential
Conference for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism
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Chapter One
The Rise of Indigenous Voices in Mexico and Ecuador
!
What does it look like to demand a new world order? What does it mean for social
movements to emerge that no longer just focus on gaining small concessions or even changing
the larger state system, but rather seek to remake the political structure entirely? On a global
scale, the trend towards greater Indigenous1 uprisings has been significant, particularly since the
1990s. From the Arctic to New Zealand to Central and South America, Indigenous groups have
sought to counteract centuries of oppression from colonialism and its legacies and seek “a world
where many worlds fit,” as one Zapatista slogan asserts. What is it that brings these very distinct
groups together under overlapping identities? Is it their corresponding histories of colonial
oppression, their general exclusion from domestic politics, or their goals for the future? Overall,
the transnational linkages drawn between various Indigenous groups around the world clearly
illustrate the power and importance of this rising tide. In the midst of this emergence, it becomes
vital to examine how these Indigenous movements challenge our existing assumptions about
social movements and what this may mean for Indigenous communities going forward.
In order to delve into the ways in which Indigenous movements may conform to and
transcend existing social movement theories, this work analyzes two major movements
beginning in the 1990s: The Zapatista movement in Mexico and the pan-Indigenous Ecuadorian
movement. Each of these movements stems from groups with similar colonial histories and has
evolved under political systems that have historically excluded them. Both groups presently lack
resources that might aid mobilization. Likewise, the overall goals of each movement revolve
around gaining greater autonomy. Autonomy entails a condition of self-government and freedom
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!The!use!of!a!capital!I!in!Indigenous!throughout!this!work!is!intentional!and!based!on!the!stated!preference!
of!the!South!and!Mesoamerican!Indian!Rights!Center!(SAIIC)!as!a!way!to!affirm!their!ethnic!identities.!
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from external control, but articulations of this goal can take various forms, ranging from
increased control over natural resources, power over education, the right to govern oneself, or
even complete secession. These pursuits all emerge from the claim that Indigenous peoples have
a right to control their own cultural, political, economic and social affairs. While the fundamental
grievances of each movement fall within this autonomy spectrum, the strategies they pursue
differ. In Ecuador, the movement began by seeking increased political participation, while the
Zapatistas tended more towards a complete rejection of state authority from the start. Where does
this difference in tactics emerge from, and what might it tell us about where Indigenous
movements fall in the world of contentious politics?
This work will delve into the previous question by exploring how identity construction,
transnational alliances, and varying political systems contribute to the strategies movements
pursue. On an empirical level, I will explain the divergence in movement tactics by noting the
success groups achieved with typical protest strategies. As Chapter Two notes, because the panIndigenous movement in Ecuador was more successful in achieving its goals through
conventional methods (such as political participation), it began by working within state
structures. The Zapatista movement, however, met significant failures by engaging with the state.
Refusing state structures, therefore, was perceived by these communities to be a more viable,
ideologically sound option. To claim autonomy or even refuse the authority of the state,
however, both cases would need to frame their movements as legitimate forces that deserved
authority instead of the state. To craft this legitimacy, both cases relied on a particular notion of
what Indigenous identity is and what it needs to thrive, as Chapter Three explores. Overall, these
cases help us better understand how political systems or varying resources cannot always explain

!

2!

movement tactics, especially when the underlying identities behind the movements are not taken
into account.
This chapter forms the foundation for understanding the evolution and intricacies of these
movements. In order to understand their relationship with existing social movement theory, I
first outline conventional frameworks for how scholars tend to conceive of contentious politics.
Next, I provide an in-depth survey of how each movement emerged and developed over time.
These details provide the reader with the necessary context to delve into deeper analysis in the
following chapters.

A Review of Social Movement Theory:
Social movement theory generally relies on the political process model, which scholars
utilize to explain the emergence, evolution and outcomes of social movements. In focusing on
one or more of these elements, the political process approach can be subsequently divided into
three explanatory factors: first, the political opportunities and constraints that the movement
faces; second, the resources and forms of mobilization available to the movement; and lastly, the
interaction between movement framing by leaders and the manner in which the general
population or the state interprets this framing. These explanations have evolved over time and
now are often employed in an overlapping manner. However, the dominant analytical
frameworks of social movement theory hinges on these explanatory factors.
The political opportunity approach stresses that the institutions, structures and political
avenues for change available to groups shape the nature of social movements. Political process
theorists such as Charles Tilly (1978), Doug McAdam (1982), and Sidney Tarrow (1983) were
among the first to articulate how social movements arise when political institutions or power
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relations shift to spur opportunities (McAdam et al. 1996). Thus, political opportunities and
constraints form the basis of movement emergence. Tarrow defines political opportunities as the
“dimensions of political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics,” while
political constraints represent “factors- like repression, but also like authorities’ capacity to
present a solid front to insurgents- that discourage contention” (Tarrow 1998, 20). For Tarrow,
movement formation depends first on whether political structures encourage or discourage
contention. In short, political cleavages or shifting opportunities and constraints incentivize the
formation of social movements. This approach has evolved to cross-national comparison of
differing political opportunities. Scholars such as Kriesi (1992), Kitshelt (1986) and Rucht
(1990) have focused on cross-national comparisons of similar movements in order to understand
how political differences incentivize their emergence (McAdam et al. 1996).
While the political opportunity approach stems from the idea that political structures
prompt movements, different scholars have emphasized various aspects of this concept. For
instance, Charles Kurzman analyzes the factors that make a state vulnerable to public pressure
along with the objective and subjective perceptions of political opportunity. He argues that the
relation between these two elements dictates movement outcomes (1996). Herbert Kitshelt,
however, contends that the relationship between political input (responsiveness to mobilization)
and political output (the political capacity to create or grant change) shapes movement outcomes
(1986). While emphasizing the configuration of political opportunity, Kurt Schock highlights the
limits to the political opportunities framework in non-democratic contexts, due to the flow of
information from an international context (1999).
As McAdam, McCarthy and Zald recognize, even in their various interpretations of the
framework, scholars generally share a focus on four elements in their analysis: “1) The relative
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openness or closure of the institutionalized political system 2) The stability or instability of a
broad set of elite alignments… 3) The presence or absence of elite allies 4) The state’s capacity
and propensity for violence” (1996, 27). These factors mold not only whether a social movement
has sufficient political opportunity to emerge, but also the manner in which the state responds to
the movement’s claims, a key element in shaping outcomes.
While political opportunities offer relevant factors for why movements emerged and help
explain outcomes to some degree, many scholars have argued that this framework does not
sufficiently explain how and why a movement evolves. As McAdams, McCarthy and Zald
recognize, “Movements may be largely born out of environmental opportunities, but their fate is
heavily shaped by their own actions” (1996, 15). The “own actions” of a movement introduces
the second approach: mobilizing structures. In the original conception of mobilizing structures,
scholars tended to focus on the resources available to movements. How groups link themselves
to these resources determines how the movement evolves. McCarthy and Zald initially
conceptualized this emphasis on group resources (1973, 1977). In doing so, these theorists broke
away from the notion that action stems entirely from group grievances and instead focused on
the mobilization processes of such groups (McAdam et al. 1996). The emphasis on mobilization
processes complemented scholars who focused on movement emergence by seeking to map the
development of a movement over time.
As this framework evolved, scholars began to also emphasize the organizational
processes of a movement rather than just the deliberate use of available resources. Charles Tilly,
for example, explored how grassroots organizations facilitate and provide structure for collective
mobilization. Later scholars drew on this approach to explain more contemporary movements.
Aldon Morris (1981) and Doug McAdam (1982) used a similar approach to examine the impact
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of churches and colleges in the Civil Rights Movement, while Sara Evans (1980) explained the
American Feminist Movement through the linkages formed by woman active in the Civil Rights
Movement. Each of these works focuses on how organizational or informal group linkages spur
collective action and shape the character of the movement over time (McAdam et al, 1996).
While resources and organizational structures may seem mutually exclusive, they
actually both spur collective action in an interrelated fashion. For instance, the spaces that groups
use to network and cultivate linkages (such as churches) can be viewed as organizational
resources. In this manner, scholars have increasingly focused on the organizational dynamics of
a movement. Tarrow, for instance, asserts that effective organization evolves out of contextdriven local units linked by connective structures and coordinated through an organization
(Tarrow 1998). In emphasizing context, connective tissue, and coordination, Tarrow highlights
organizational structures at the local, regional, and national level. McAdams, McCarthy and Zald
likewise illustrate how the “organizational profile” of a movement shapes its evolution.
Specifically, they argue that mobilization procedures- such as disruptive tactics, the radical flank
effect (where the presence of extremist groups makes a moderate group’s claims more
reasonable), and the threats embedded in the group’s goals- explain how the movement develops.
Overall, scholars in this framework tend to focus on three (sometimes overlapping) factors: “1)
comparison of the ‘organizational infrastructures’ of countries… 2) specification of the
relationship between organizational form and type of movement, and 3) assessment of the effect
of both state structures and national ‘organizing cultures’ on the form that movements take in a
given country” (McAdam et al. 1996, 4). In these factors, mobilizing structures begin to intersect
with political opportunities within the state.
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While political opportunity and mobilizing structures explore the interaction between a
movement and the state, they do not probe the interfaces between movement leaders and the
movement populace. The framing processes approach begins to dig into these interactions by
exploring how leaders mold the character of the movement to achieve their goals and how these
movements come to be interpreted. In order to mobilize, people have to both hold a strong
grievance and a sense that acting collectively will help alleviate their distress. Thus, framing by
leaders can spur or suppress action. David Snow is known as the primary scholar who
constructed the concept of framing processes, and in doing so began to cultivate the importance
of ideas in movements (Snow et al. 1986). Movements do not merely emerge out of the
materials, organizing structures and political opportunities, but rather involve a complex
interaction with those holding the grievances.
Even scholars such as Charles Tilly (1978), Sydney Tarrow (1983, 1989), and Joshua
Gamson (1991), who tended to previously focus on the political and organizational factors
behind movements, came to recognize the “catalytic effect of ideas” (McAdam et al. 1996, 5).
The dissemination and social construction of new ideas, however, is a relatively amorphous
realm. For this reason, scholars either tend to avoid the matter completely, or like Snow, confine
themselves to a relatively strict notion of framing processes. Even McAdam et al. define framing
as “the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the
world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (1996, 6). In this manner,
framing processes are about strategically cultivating collective action by fashioning shared
understandings, rather than voicing the shared understandings that already exist.
While scholars generally leave culture outside the lens of their focus, certain scholars
have begun to examine how the dissemination of ideas interacts with existing cultures. Tarrow,
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for instance, explores how leaders ground messages in the local culture to contextualize the
movement. In this process, there is always a delicate balance between framing messages in a
culturally relevant manner and using messages that are new and innovative enough to spur
action. Collective action frames, Tarrow contends, are not just about reiterating the values and
symbols of a culture (because often groups are rebelling against subsets of their own culture), but
reframing these messages into frames of contention. Symbols begin to hold emotional value and
electrify individuals into action through this type of framing. For Tarrow, framing processes
entail embedding new frames into an existing cultural web to mobilize action (Tarrow 1998).
While social movement theory focuses on the role of the state, resources, organization
networks and framing in shaping the course of a movement, the anthropological tradition
considers the role of identity, both in facilitating movement development and in bringing up
particular tensions. Although a comprehensive review of identity formation theory is not
necessary for our purposes, certain conceptions of identity are noteworthy, due to the unique role
of an Indigenous identity in these movements. For instance, gay rights scholar Mary Bernstein
argues that in social movements, identity can be employed both instrumentally (to achieve a
certain political goal) and expressively (to assert the value of that particular identity) (1997).
Bernstein and Verta Taylor later build on this notion to note how movement identities that are
both expressive and instrumental can often maintain an essentialist construction of what this
identity entails. An essentialist or strict definition of what a certain identity is and who it includes
can help differentiate a group from the dominant culture and thus spur collective action (2013).
However, when a movement is based on a definitive group identity, gaining support from outside
alliances that do not share this identity may be difficult. This pull between a strict movement
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identity and a broader, inclusive identity lies at the root of the tension between gaining outside
alliances and expressing the value of the particular identity at stake.
When focusing on Indigenous rights movements, scholars tend to combine an
anthropological, identity-focused lens with elements of social movement theory. Alison Brysk,
for examples, begins her examination of Latin American Indigenous social movements by asking
where these movements fit in typical conceptualizations of ethnic theory. Can Indigenous
movements be regarded as ethnic mobilization or do they fall more in the realm of nationalism?
Brysk draws on Crawford Young’s concept of cultural pluralism (1976), which argues that
Indigenous identities transcend ethnic boundaries. However, she subsequently argues that
Indigenous groups presently organize in an ethnic fashion. Brysk notes:
The boundaries of ethnic mobilization for indigenous groups are unusually imprecise and
multiple, with overlapping identities. Yet at most of these levels… Indian movements
display the ‘syndrome of characteristics’ said to define ethnic groups: a common name,
myth of common origin, common historical memories and territory, cultural linguistic
links, and a sense of solidarity (2000, 38).
Brysk leaves open the possibility that these groups also mobilize under a nationalistic frame,
arguing that they “simultaneously assert claims as nations and within nations” (2000, 38) Such
nationalism for Brysk, however, would fall under cultural nationalism rather than the traditional
political nationalism (2000).
If Indigenous movements fall somewhere between ethnic mobilization and cultural
nationalism, what role does identity play in their development? Brysk contends, “The Latin
American Indian rights movement fits best a view of ethnic politics as an interactive construction
of identity that embodies both strategic and symbolic elements and evolves over time” (2000,
39). She argues that since Indigenous groups often lack resources and avenues to address their
grievances, the powerless enact change by projecting their identities and ideas into the global
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arena. In this manner, movement framing and identity construction matter, both in producing
certain identities and representing those identities to the state and an international audience. Such
messaging helps to write a collective identity for Indigenous groups and cause communities to
forge new ways of understanding themselves in the context of a nation-state. Change, according
to Brysk, comes through the politics of persuasion and by using a local identity to link
Indigenous causes to an international audience. Overall, Brysk underscores how movements both
cultivate and transmit ideas and identities- a social constructivist approach to understanding
Indigenous movements (2000).
If Brysk conceptualizes Indigenous movements in terms of their cultural-nationalistic,
ethnic, and identity-based nature, other scholars consider how this identity power comes to
confront state power. These scholars examine how groups confront not only the state, but the
general international order. Noam Chomsky, for instance, highlights the ideological divide
between European (or “Western”) notions of power and Indigenous systems of communalism
(Meyer and Alvarado 2010). In a similar mode, Lois Meyer defines “Western” as “the
hegemonic values, beliefs, and policies which undergird global neoliberal capitalism,” and she
sets Indigenous movements in opposition to this order (Meyer and Alvarado 2010, 9). In a
similar vein to Chomsky and Meyer, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz and Jerry Mander argue that
Indigenous movements counter three broad trends stemming from the western world:
individualism, homogenization, and neoliberal capitalism (2006). Homogenization includes
historical and present cultural suppression as well as educational standardization. Neoliberal
capitalism likewise involves a more globalized world order and exploitation (especially of
resources) from capitalism. By framing many Indigenous movements in opposition to these
Western developments, leaders once again link local identities with international ideals.
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Certain North American scholars have gone even further than examining the oppositional
nature of Indigenous social movements. Scholars such as Audra Simpson (2014), Taiaiake
Alfred (2000), and Glen Sean Coulthard (2014) highlight Indigenous peoples’ active refusal of
Western power structures. Alfred, for instance, unpacks the notion of sovereignty, highlighting
how evoking this non-Indigenous concept through Western legal systems is the only way for
many Indigenous people to address their grievances. He notes, “The practice of sovereignty in
the structures of governments and state agencies offered another forum for the subordination of
principle” (Alfred 2000, 24). While sovereignty is often referred to as a solution to tribal-state
relations, Alfred demonstrates how Indigenous grievances must always be framed within existing
Western structural and legal parameters. Alfred thus argues that Indigenous movements should
seek to transcend and refuse Westernized sovereignty (Alfred 2000).
Both Coulthard and Simpson make a similar argument surrounding recognition of
Indigenous groups by the state. Coulthard’s Red Skins White Mask unpacks the notion of
recognition by illustrating how accommodation and recognition are asymmetrical exchanges that
reinforce state domination. Since recognition gives the state the power to assess the validity of
Indigenous existence, Coulthard argues that recognition is not a reconciliatory or neutral process.
Through her explanation of the “politics of bestowal,” Simpson also asserts how any form of
recognition, including citizenship granted by the state, is still a paternalistic act. Simpson
describes politics of bestowal as a situation in which “sovereignty is bestowed rather than
asserted, and then acknowledged as inherent” (2014, 157). If bestowed sovereignty and
recognition are paternalistic acts, Simpson and Coulthard argue that refusing citizenship,
recognition, and granted sovereignty represents an active affront to state power. Overall,
Indigenous social movement scholars tend towards an anthropological, identity-centered
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approach that considers how these groups confront both state power while linking their struggle
to the international order.
This paper expands on the work of Indigenous movement scholars by continuing to
examine how these relatively marginalized groups have come to challenge nation-state authority.
By connecting their anthropological approaches to social movement theory, however, this work
bridges the gap between a state-centered analysis and approaches that discount the role of state
systems. To that end, I will consider the political opportunity structure, resource mobilization,
and framing processes to examine how they are relevant to the selected cases. However, due
their lack of consideration of the role of identity, these frameworks are not an entirely sufficient
explanation. I will thus expand on these theories, focusing particularly on the political
opportunity structure, to note the limits to this particular framework when it comes to uniquely
marginalized, identity-based groups.
The unique way in which these groups confront state power extends beyond the
boundaries of the political opportunity structure. Just as Simpson, Coulthard and Alfred point out
how Indigenous groups refuse certain state mechanisms (such as recognition and sovereignty),
this work expands their concepts to point out how Indigenous groups in Mexico and Ecuador
also refuse overall state dominance. This “politics of refusal,” as I will explore in Chapter Two,
highlights how, since these Indigenous actors do not perceive viable political avenues available
to them to address their grievances, they may aim to transcend the political opportunity structure.
In refusing state power, they seek to create a new order with room for collective, Indigenous
identities within the state. To build this new order, however, Indigenous groups must construct a
legitimate collective identity that speaks to Indigenous peoples’ grievances. Chapter 3 will
analyze the collective identities constructed throughout both movements, and how such
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construction goes beyond the framing processes approach. With an examination of both the
political opportunity structure and identity, this work will ultimately delve into how these two
realms intersect. Specifically, it will dissect the political opportunity structure and complicate its
central thesis with the notion of identity, highlighting how the political opportunity structure only
truly applies to those that are substantially included in political systems.

The Zapatista Movement: Pursuing a New World Order
Like the pan-Indigenous movement in Ecuador, the Zapatista movement articulates itself
as Indigenous and seeks greater autonomy based on this identity. Autonomy entails control over
specific land, specialized educational systems, unique cultural rights, and the ability to have a
least some self-government. The Zapatistas see the state as the principle perpetrator of
oppression, although foreign influence (especially with the creation of NAFTA) is also identified
as antithetical to what the movement desires. Despite these shared qualities with Ecuador and
many Indigenous movements, the Zapatista’s principle tactic for pushing these claims has tended
towards refusing state structures. While the movement began with armed resistance and then
shifted to negotiations with the state, it now focuses inward. Rather than concentrating the entire
movement on pressuring the state, the Zapatistas have rejected state authority and instead chose
to implement their own systems of government, education, and medical care. To understand why
this shift occurred, it first is necessary to understand how the movement developed.
The Zapatista movement began as an armed uprising on January 1st, 1994 to resist trends
towards neoliberal policies in Mexico. On this day, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) went into effect between the United States, Canada, and Mexico, and Tzeltal, Tzotzil,
Tojolaval, Chol and other Mayan communities organized to protest the burdens the agreement
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would place on them. Although the movement became recognized during this time, peasant
communities in Chiapas had been organizing for a decade before. These Mayan villages first
united politically in an attempt to distance themselves from the Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) that had been ruling Mexico since the 1930s and had continuously disregarded and
exploited Indigenous communities. In December 1991, the PRI passed a “modification” to
Article 27 in the 1917 Constitution, which had previously protected communal land ownership in
Indigenous communities. The modification removed this fundamental right and threatened
privatization of Indigenous collective lands. It was this threat to communal land that prompted
greater organization among Mayan communities in the region (Stahler-Sholk 2010).
The PRI’s modification of the Constitution certainly helped instigate Mayan political
organization in the Chiapas highlands, but the implementation of NAFTA was the tipping point
in the Zapatista uprising. While the Mexican government propagated NAFTA as a modernization
mechanism to bring Mexico into the global economic order, the agreement would engender
immense poverty in Mexico, especially for Indigenous communities. This poverty was two-fold.
First it would generate an infiltration of American-made goods that peasant communities
couldn’t afford. Second, it would damage peasants’ livelihood because rural (often Indigenous)
people, whose income relied on farming, could no longer compete with cheap American
agricultural products. Thus, these communities could no longer make a living and couldn’t even
afford the “cheap” American products that were theoretically supposed to improve their living
standards (Rodriguez 1995). Because the Mayan communities in Chiapas relied almost
exclusively on farming (particularly corn) to make a living, NAFTA became an Indigenous
issue.
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Over the course of its history, the Zapatista movement has sought to redefine autonomy,
mobilize civil society, link into transnational networks, and ultimately refuse the dominance of
the nation-state. Zapatistas emphasize that the movement must stem from the grassroots,
gathering momentum from the voices of the community. This emphasis on the community has
translated into asserting autonomy through Indigenous schools and health clinics, both of which
put forth alternative forms of political legitimacy. In this realm, autonomy focuses on creating
more horizontal and participatory spaces that incorporate Indigenous communities and exclude
the state.
Zapatista leadership has been an essential element of the movement, especially the
notorious Subcomandante Marcos, a mestizo man and former professor who became both a
leader and a symbol for the Zapatistas. Marcos only first arrived in Chiapas in the 1980s, after
decades of attempted revolutionary organizing in other parts of Mexico. Marcos emphasizes that
he is “merely a ‘subcomandante’ beholden to a shadowy group of indigenous leaders,” and
maintains that he has learned everything from these Mayan communities (Nepstad and Bob
2006). Nevertheless, Marcos is the primary strategist for the movement, planning its military
fronts, protests, negotiations, and media appeals. His copious writings and intriguing persona
have helped cultivate an international following (Nepstad and Bob 2006). In 2014, Marcos
reinvented himself as Subcomandante Galeano, taking the name of a Zapatista teacher and leader
that had been killed by Mexican paramilitary groups. While Marcos is the most famous and
influential leader, other “subcomandantes” have also had key leadership roles in the movement,
including seven female leaders. It is therefore important to remember that although the Zapatista
movement does represent the collaboration of many Mayan communities, Marcos and other
leaders maintain significant power over the movement’s development.
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The movement began with an armed phase. In response to the perceived threat from
NAFTA, The Ejército Zapatista Liberación Nacional (EZLN, Zapatista National Liberation
Army) issued a declaration of war with the Mexican state on behalf of the region’s Mayan
people. Subcomandante Marcos headed the EZLN and this initial occupation. On January 1st,
1994, an EZLN armed force of about 2,000 men and women seized government offices and
thousands of acres of private land in Chiapas (Nash 2001). This self-proclaimed army certainly
appeared unconventional from the start. Many of the rebels were barefoot, wore cheap army
uniforms, covered their faces with bandanas, and carried sticks or hunting rifles. From a
municipal building in San Cristobal de las Casas, Subcomandante Marcos emerged to issue the
“First Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle.” This statement not only declared war on the
Mexican state, but also set forth the EZLN’s twelve demands: freedom, democracy, justice,
peace, land, education, health, housing, food, development, cultural rights, and women’s rights
(Ortiz 2001). These first demands largely centered on access to basic resources, health and
education. In response to the uprising, the Mexican army sent about 12,000 federal troops to the
region, causing a series of confrontations that resulted in 145 deaths and many more casualties
(Escuelas para Chiapas 2015). The armed phase of the movement lasted only twelve days, as the
two sides agreed to a cease-fire. This agreement was largely possible because of immense
international human rights attention, particularly in regards to abuses from the Mexican state
(Ortiz 2001).
The ceasefire led to further peace negotiations between the Mexican government and the
EZLN, conducted by Bishop Samuel Ruiz García in a San Cristobal cathedral. The assassination
of the PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio, however, suspended these mediations.
Despite this suspension, the EZLN did not cease organizing. In August 1994, the EZLN invited
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civil society groups from across Mexico to a convention in Chiapas, focusing on next steps for
the movement. The EZLN named the town where they convened “Aguascalientes” after the city
where the Federal Constitution had been drafted in 1917 after the Mexican revolution (Ortiz
2001). After continued and failed negotiations with the state, the EZLN shifted their goals to a
nonviolent campaign aimed at declaring the illegitimacy of the state and asserting the EZLN’s
right to govern its own communities. In December 1994, Indigenous EZLN leaders created their
own system of government, revolving around 38 Zapatista Autonomous Rebel Municipalities
(Stahler-Sholk 2010). The EZLN declared these new municipalities to be superimposed over the
preceding official municipalities, and to be governed by the Rebel Zapatista Autonomous
Municipalities (MAREZ), composed of Zapatista leaders. MAREZ would also be in charge of
creating and running schools, health clinics, development projects and systems of justice. This
assertion of autonomy was intended to reinvigorate ancestral, communal forms of government
and represent greater resistance towards the Mexican state by undermining its authority over the
region (S!Paz 2012). State and local government continued to function in non-Zapatista
territories, however, and tension between these local structures and Zapatista communities have
been significant throughout the movement.
As the EZLN continued to mobilize and resist in Chiapas, the Mexican state grew
increasingly wary of the movement. In February 1995, the government broke the negotiated
ceasefire with a military offensive against the Zapatistas. The army destroyed the Aguascalientes
cultural center and issued arrest warrants for Zapatista leaders (Ortiz 2001). Mass numbers of
peasants began to flee into the Lacandón rainforest to avoid the indiscriminate military attacks.
Nevertheless, the military still arrested, jailed and tortured several dozen people under claimed
terrorism charges (Escuelas para Chiapas 2015). By 1995, the army began to recognize the
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ineffective nature of its offensive, and in March, it withdrew as the government reopened the
opportunity for peace talks. The state created the Commission on Concordance and Pacification
(COCOPA) as the organization in charge of corresponding with the Zapatistas. The EZLN
responded to the destruction of their cultural center by building five new “Aguascalientes”
cultural centers (Ortiz 2001).
After pressure from other Mexican civil society groups, the EZLN agreed to once again
negotiate with the state. Beforehand, the group held a National Indigenous Forum attended by
over 500 Indigenous people, as well as an “Intercontinental Meeting for Humanity and Against
Neoliberalism” for thousands of worldwide human rights advocates (Escuelas para Chiapas
2015). Then in mid 1996, Zapatista leaders met with Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo and
COCOPA in San Andrés, Chiapas and signed the San Andrés Accords on Indigenous Rights and
Culture. The accords focused on respecting the diversity of Indigenous communities, conserving
natural resources in Indigenous territories, increasing their participation in political affairs, and
asserting their right to self-determination. Because it would require significant concessions to
Indigenous people (especially in terms of resources) the Mexican government, however,
ultimately rejected this declaration, and Zedillo never signed it into law (Navarro 1999). The
ELZN maintained that it would not return to negotiate with the state unless the San Andrés
Accords were implemented.
Since negotiations with the Mexican government proved unsuccessful, Zapatistas moved
to a new strategy of redefining power: rejecting the state’s claims to authority over Zapatista
communities and claiming full autonomy. After 1996, these Indigenous communities rejected all
government aid and programs, including the federally run schools in the region. This action was
part of a larger strategy to reject the government’s carrot and stick approach- the Mexican state
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neither had the authority to subdue the movement with force nor grant its legitimacy. Each of
these claimed governmental powers, the movement contended, disempower Indigenous
communities by undermining their own rights to control themselves (Stahler-Sholk 2010). To
this end, the ELZN expanded the existing Zapatista municipalities to include their own judicial
systems and political assemblies. Assembly leaders would be elected by the consensus of open
community assemblies, and collective work would be an essential piece of each municipality
(Ortiz 2001). While focusing on autonomy, the movement continued to press for the
implementation of the San Andrés Accords, and in 1997, nine thousand civilians marched in San
Cristobal for this end.
The Mexican state did not completely ignore the movement during this period. Rather, in
1997 and 1998, the army carried out a number of covert attacks on remote communities. The
biggest of these, known as the Acteal Massacre, occurred when paramilitary groups associated
with the PRI murdered 45 Indigenous Zapatista sympathizers, most of which were women and
children. In 1998 alone, the government carried out four different significant attacks on Zapatista
municipalities, arresting local leaders and killing civilians. During this time, the federal
government also launched a campaign to expel foreign rights workers from the region (Escuelas
para Chiapas 2015).
To pressure the government to leave the region and finally adopt the San Andrés accords,
the Zapatista movement began to draw on leftist domestic and international support. In March
1999, the Zapatistas organized the Plebiscite on Indigenous Rights and Culture, and sent two
Zapatista representatives to every municipality in Mexico to spread awareness of their overall
goals. In 2000, Vicente Fox of the National Action Party (PAN) became president in what many
consider to be Mexico’s first truly democratic election. This monumental election overturned
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seventy years of rule by the PRI, and many Zapatista leaders remained hopeful that Fox would
work with their demands. Similarly, Pablo Salazar, an oppositional candidate to the PRI, won the
gubernatorial election in Chiapas. To capitalize on this political shift, the Zapatistas proclaimed
that to reopen negotiations, Fox would need to remove troops from the region, release Zapatista
prisoners, and implement the San Andrés Accords. While Fox did withdraw some troops and
release a few prisoners, these were more token gestures than substantial changes, as small-scale
warfare continued in the region (Burke 2003).
The Zapatistas continued to pressure the federal government by bolstering international
attention, and in 2001, twenty-four Zapatista commanders (including Marcos) and over 100,000
supporters marched unarmed from Chiapas to Mexico City through an action titled the “March of
the Colored Earth.” Upon arrival, Zapatista leaders addressed the Mexican Congress, calling for
the full implementation of the San Andrés Accords and the right to autonomy. Because the
political climate had shifted with the PRI’s defeat, President Vicente Fox was more
accommodating to Zapatista claims. Fox recognized a version of the San Andrés Accords, which
(at least in theory) allowed Indigenous communities to decide “their internal forms of
coexistence and social, economic, political and cultural organization” (Vann 2001). However, it
lacked the specificity that the former San Andrés Accords had provided, and thus Zapatista
leaders rejected the document.
With its failed attempts to pressure the federal government for autonomy, the Zapatista
leaders once again focused on autonomy. In 2003, Zapatista commanders decided to implement
the rights outlined in the San Andrés Accords themselves. Leaders declared at a gathering of
10,000 people that Zapatista territory would be divided into five autonomous “Caracoles.” These
new regions would bind Zapatista municipalities together and would be governed by rotating
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“good governance councils.” The decentralized nature of government in this rural context meant
that policy implementation would vary from one Caracol to another. However, the intent of this
new structure was not to impose a unified central model of governance, but rather to adapt
policies to the context of each region and include the voices of all community members (StahlerSholk 2010). Once again, the Zapatistas did not see their government as existing as a subset of
the Mexican state structure, but rather as its own distinct entity.
In the early 2000s, the Mexican military continued its presence in Chiapas, which often
erupted in violence. The army also began a campaign to displace Indigenous people from the
Montes Azules Biosphere reserve in order to better “preserve the jungle.” It soon became clear
that this campaign was rather intended to make room for tourism in the region and assert
governmental authority. In 2005, the Zapatistas once again reconceptualized the movement by
systematically linking itself to other leftists and social change groups domestically and
internationally. With the launching of the “Other Campaign,” the Zapatistas invited leftist
organizations to its preparatory meetings in Chiapas (Stahler-Sholk 2010). Through these
reunions, the movement created a coalition of 64 leftist political organizations, 118 Indigenous
groups, 197 social organizations, and 474 NGOs that all pledged their official support to the
Zapatista cause. At the start of 2006, Subcomandante Marcos embarked on a six-month tour to
meet with all the various groups taking part in the campaign (Escuelas para Chiapas 2015).
In subsequent years, the movement continued to gather and harness the support of
Mexican and international leftist groups. In 2007, the Zapatistas led the First (and later Second)
Encounter between the Zapatistas and the Peoples of the World as an opportunity to explain their
campaign to over 2,000 people from 43 different countries. However, continued paramilitary
attacks on Zapatista communities eventually forced them to suspend the campaign at the end of
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the year. Additionally, in 2008, Mexico’s energy secretary announced plans to begin oil drilling
in the Lacandón Jungle. A year later, the World Tourist Organization launched their plans for a
major tourist development initiative in the region. By 2011, the Mexican Army even announced
the formation of two military bases along the Chiapas-Guatemala border (Escuelas para Chiapas
2015). These examples can be viewed as instances of the federal government attempting to
reassert its power over the region.
The Zapatistas, however, were certainly not complacent in the face of the federal
government’s attempts to regain control. In 2011, twenty thousand Zapatistas, including twenty
leaders, marched through the streets of San Cristobal to draw attention to the increased
militarization of the region. To show support, eleven political prisoners, who had been members
of the “Other Campaign” organizations, began a hunger strike at the state prison in Chiapas. As a
result, two of these political prisoners were released. The end of 2012 brought another mass
Zapatistas march, since it marked the end of the Mayan Long Count Calendar and the start of a
new age– an age where, according to the Zapatistas, justice and inclusion would be the norm. On
December 21st, forty thousand people marched through five Chiapas cities, marking the
movement’s largest demonstration. During the march, one EZLN leader shouted, “Did you hear
it? It’s the sound of their world ending. It’s that of ours resurging” (Escuelas para Chiapas 2015).
This shift in calendar for the Mayan communities highlights how the Zapatista movement
equated the coming of a new age with a new world order.
Today, the Zapatistas primarily focus on building their autonomy through continued
expansion of schools, health clinics, and governmental systems. As one community member
from the Zapatista community of Oventik noted, Indigenous villagers are focusing on their
communities and awaiting the moment when Subcomandante Marcos will reappear and call for
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another march (personal correspondence, January 2016). However, as Zapatista communities
maintain their own social systems, they continue to struggle to sustain themselves economically.
In this vein, they rely on their transnational network and international attention for financial
support. Fair-trade coffee sales, artisan cooperatives, agroecology workshops, international
donations and even “Zapa-tourism” initiatives have all contributed financially. Zapatista
sympathizers even run multiple artisan stores in San Cristobal de las Casas for financial support.
The Zapatista pursuit of autonomy through governmental, health care, and educational structures,
therefore hinges on the support of international communities.
According to Richard Stahler-Sholk, a scholar focused on the uprising, Zapatista
philosophy relies on four main concepts: reframing notions of power, redefining autonomy,
constructing a new social subjective and creating radical democracy (2010). These elements
interweave to create a movement focused on fundamentally contesting state domination. In
reframing notions of power, Zapatistas stress the slogan “Another World is Possible” and
envision a world where human rights and dignity are valued and where Indigenous communities
maintain control over their resources and affairs (Stahler-Sholk 2010). In this manner, the
Zapatista movement asserts itself against traditional state power in order to construct its own
social order.
The movement also questions established forms of power by emphasizing that their
rebellion is not a revolution. The overall goal is not to seize power in the existing state, but rather
focuses on building a more just alternative political and economic order. In this manner, the
Zapatistas are rebelling not just against Mexico, but also against the neoliberal framework. As
scholar John Holloway notes:
What is at issue is not who exercises power, but how to create a world based on the
mutual recognition of human dignity, on social relations which are not power relations…
!
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This is the challenge that has been formulated most clearly by the Zapatista uprising in
the southeast of Mexico (quoted in Khasnabish 2010, 82).
By not seizing control of the state, Zapatistas do not intend to perpetuate existing power
struggles, but rather intend to create a system with space for their values and way of life. Thus,
the Zapatistas have reconceptualized autonomy to be about neither secession nor gaining
authority from the state. Rather, autonomy is centered on creating an inclusive social space
where community members make decisions over their own affairs.
Ecuador’s Indigenous Movement: Coalition-Building for Structural Change
Unlike the Zapatista movement, the Ecuadorian Indigenous movement began with a
greater focus on increasing political participation for Indigenous groups. Indigenous
representation in government remained very low and without a political voice, increased
autonomy seemed like a distant reality for many tribes. Prior to this national movement, alliances
among Indigenous groups existed on a regional basis, if at all. As consciousness shifted to
highlight how Indigenous grievances in the Amazon paralleled demands in the highlands,
collective action by regional groups translated these desires to the national stage. The formation
of Ecuador’s Confederación de las Nacionalidades de Indígenas del Ecuador (Confederation of
Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, CONAIE) marked the combination of regional groups to
push for Indigenous rights at the national level. Throughout the movement, Indigenous
Ecuadorians have engaged with the political system to push their agendas, by toppling dictators,
organizing marches, initiating lawsuits, and even forming their own political party. If Ecuadorian
Indigenous groups held similar demands and had faced parallel historical marginalization, why
did they choose to primarily engage with the state, while the Zapatistas chose to reject state
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structures? To delve into this question, an in-depth look at the evolution of the Ecuadorian
movement is necessary.
Since the 1980s, Indigenous groups in Ecuador have vacillated between popular uprising
and political participation to pursue greater autonomy. Over the course of the movement, the
debate has centered on whether Indigenous people should engage in politics, and if so, over the
best manner to do so. Should the goal be to support existing candidates that might be
sympathetic to their concerns, or should they put forth their own candidates? At the crux of the
movement in 1995, Indigenous activists created their own platform for political participation
with the formation of the Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (commonly referred to
as Pachakutik). In Quechua, pacha means “time” or “land” and kutik means “a return,”
exemplifying the Indigenous cosmology inherent in the party. As Marc Becker writes in his
analysis of Pachakutik, “The word signifies change, rebirth, and transformation, both in the sense
of a return in time and the coming of a new era” (2012, 1). In this sense, the word conjures up a
situation in which oppression is remembered, but a new future becomes possible through selfdetermination (Becker 2012).
Pachakutik represented an avenue to participation in a political system that largely did
not include Indigenous people. Through Pachakutik and CONAIE, Indigenous groups organized
to support candidates who defended their interests (Becker 2012). While Ecuador’s Indigenous
movement has been extremely successful at times in building coalitions across the nation’s
numerous Indigenous groups, the diversity of interests involved in the movement has also caused
significant fractionalization. Today, the debate centers on whether political participation is
indeed the best route to change or whether Indigenous interests can only truly be pursued by
refusal the existing political structure.
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The diverse nature of Ecuador’s Indigenous groups highlights the difficulty of creating
pan-Indigenous coalitions. The percentage of Indigenous people in Ecuador is highly contested
and ranges from a low of 7% in the 2001 census to 40% by CONAIE’s estimates. These
populations are divided between Ecuador’s three main geographic regions: the Pacific coastal
lowlands, the Sierra highlands and the upper east Amazon basin (Becker 2012). The majority of
Indigenous Ecuadorians live in the highlands, and are often grouped as “Kichwa,” due to their
membership in the larger ethno-linguistic Quechua group. Among these highland groups,
regional divisions and attachment to local identities remains strong. In the Amazon basin, the
Achuar, Cofán, Huaorani, Secoya, Shuar, Siona, Zápara and Kichwa face increasing threats to
their resources and are the most heavily affected by oil drilling. Six main groups remain in the
coastal region: the Awá, Chachi, Epera, Manta, Tsáchila and Wankavilka, but these communities
remain small and do not always maintain their ethnic identity (Becker 2012). Given the
geographic and cultural diversity of Ecuador’s indigenous people, as well as their diversity of
concerns and interests, fractionalization has been a consistent theme in Indigenous mobilization.
Attempts to mobilize various Indigenous groups began as early as 1944, when the
Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios (Ecuadorian Federation of Indians, FEI) was created as the
peasant arm of the communist party. However, the group’s cultural claims began to conflict with
Marxist ideology, and thus it was unable to have any lasting political effects. During this time,
however, new forms of Indigenous organization developed across the regions. The comuna, a
traditional form of collective living that safeguards Indigenous values, practices, and land, is
considered to be the nucleus of Indigenous society in Ecuador. However, in the northern
highlands, Indigenous groups began to abandon this way of living in favor of the socialist
cooperatives spreading throughout the region (Becker 2012).
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In the central highlands, the Catholic Church gained support from Indigenous peasants by
protecting Indigenous comunas. In the 1970s, the Church then played a major role in forming
ECUARUNARI, the main group that would represent Indigenous interests in the highlands (Rice
2012). ECUARUNARI comes from a Quechua phrase meaning “Awakening of Ecuadorian
Indians” and formed in 1972 by an Indigenous congress of 200 delegates from various Andean
communities (with support from the Church). This congress met with the intent to create a
strictly Indigenous organization in the Ecuadorian highlands that could work with nonIndigenous sectors of the population to advance socially, economically and politically
(Ecuarunari). ECUARUNARI was a key part of the Indigenous movement in the 1990s and
continues to be a strong presence in the highlands.
The Church was also a major organizing agent for Indigenous groups in the Amazon.
Political parties tended to direct their interest away from the region because its poor
infrastructure and low population density created difficulties in mobilizing voters. Due to this
lack of political mobilization, Protestant and Catholic missionaries continued to be the main
connective tissue between groups until the 1980s (Rice 2012). The organizational structures
developed by the Church thus linked various tribes together and set the stage for Indigenous
mobilization later on.
In the 1970s, the Indigenous movement often articulated itself as a distinctly peasant
movement fighting for agrarian reforms, rather than an identity-based movement. In 1972, the
FEI (the peasant arm of the communist party), ECUARUNARI, and FENOC (Ecuadorian
Federation of Agricultural Workers), came together to form the Frente Unitario de Reforma
Agraria (FURA, United Front for Agrarian Reform). The fact that ECUARUNARI, a decidedly
Indigenous organization, participated in this new group for agrarian reform highlights the land-
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based nature of Indigenous grievances. By 1978, FEI, FENOC and ECUARUNARI met once
again to create the Frente Único de Lucha Campesina (FULC, United Front for the Peasant
Struggle), once again illustrating the alliances between strictly Indigenous and broader peasant
organizations. This group specifically articulated their opposition to the state’s most recent land
reforms and sought to “define a united policy for the indigenous and peasant sectors” (Ibarra
1992, 100). The group later changed its name to Frente Único de Lucha Campesina e Indígena to
articulate the group’s Indigenous identity (Becker 2008).
As ECUARUNARI formed with the help of the Church in the highlands, Amazonian
groups began to unite to address their grievances against the state as well. To this end, the
Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana (CONFENIAE,
Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon) formed in August 1980
during the Regional Conference of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadoran Amazon.
CONFENIAE was a non-governmental organization that fought the exploitation of Indigenous
lands, especially by oil corporations. Its goals included the protection of Indigenous lands,
creation of Indigenous unity across the Amazon, representation of Indigenous wishes in creating
sustainable development, respect for Indigenous medicine and intellectual property, and
advancement of bicultural education (Becker 2012, 6). Many of the aims mirrored the goals of
groups across Ecuador, but with particular emphasis on resisting corporate development of their
lands. CONFENAIE was the first group to begin articulating its grievances based on the unique
position of Indigenous nationalities (Becker 2012). As Indigenous scholar Alfredo Viteri
articulates, “We have claimed the term nationalities as a category that includes all of the different
Indigenous groups” (1983). This emphasis on nationality was an important step in uniting
communities across the region and eventually across the country.
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By October 1980, the linkages between these regional Indigenous groups continued to
expand. On October 16th, the alliance between ECUARUNARI, FENOC, and FEI mobilized to
action with the National Peasant Indigenous March “Martyrs of Aztra” in Quito. The march
denounced electoral corruption, opposed recent agrarian reforms and sought to cultivate a
“united peasant-indigenous group against hunger and governmental corruption” (Ibarra 1992, 99,
my translation). Towards the end of October, this mobilization culminated in the formation of the
Consejo Nacional de Coordinación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONACNIE,
National Coordinating Council of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador). This new group was
created by ECUARUNARI and CONFENIAE, representing an important link between highland
and Amazonian Indigenous groups (Ibarra 1992).
These growing pan-Indigenous linkages set the stage for the emergence of the key
organization behind the Indigenous movement, which would serve to unite Indigenous groups
from all major regions. In November 1986, delegates representing nine Indigenous groups and
twenty-seven organizations gathered outside Quito to form the Confederación de las
Nacionalidades de Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE). This national Indigenous group united
CONFENIAE in the Amazon, ECUARUNARI in the highlands and a smaller coastal
organization called the Coordinadora de Organizaciones Indígenas de la Costa Ecuatoriana
(COICE, Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organizations of the Ecuadorian Coast), which
CONAIE created at the time to unite coastal tribes. CONAIE intended to join existing groups
under one umbrella organization in order to push Indigenous agendas for political, social, and
educational reforms to the national level. As Indigenous activists previously had recognized, “If
we do not reinforce our unity, there is a danger that various maneuvers would divide us and we
would lose our presence” (in Becker 2012, 8).
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In addition to consolidating Indigenous interests, CONAIE aims to fight for the
protection of Indigenous territory, the right to intercultural and bilingual education, the
fortification of cultural identity, against the oppression of civil and church authorities, and
against colonialism. Overall, they aim to defend “the dignity of Indigenous nationalities and
communities” (conaie.org, my translation). CONAIE maintains that the right for Indigenous
groups to maintain their own governmental systems that prioritize communitarian living lies at
the heart of these goals, but that political participation in a fair democracy is also essential.
Lastly, they maintain that relations with Indigenous groups across the continent are crucial to
creating an alternative way of living for Indigenous people (CONAIE 2015). These goals intend
to encompass the varying aims of each regional Indigenous group. CONAIE’s leadership
consists of an elected president and a few other top leadership posts, with regional leaders
forming a second tier of organizational governance (Jo-Marie 2000). With this structure, each
regional group’s demands hold a key place in the national movement.
The ability to unite Ecuador’s various Indigenous groups depended on CONAIE’s
capacity to blend both ethnic and class struggles in order to tie into the increasing unity between
Indigenous groups and labor movements. CONAIE thus sought to cultivate solidarity with the
workers’ movement and progressive sects of the population by building on previously mentioned
ties between Indigenous and peasant identities. These alliances strengthened the organization’s
presence in the political world. However, CONAIE consistently struggled to incorporate the
views of its differing populations. Because COICE had been created by CONAIE, and there
wasn’t a strong history of Indigenous organization along the coast, the coastal segment of
CONAIE remained largely symbolic. Despite the imperfect nature of Indigenous unification,
CONAIE did bring these groups together to seek not just political participation, but “the
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transformation of the nature of the current power of the hegemonic uni-national State which is
exclusionary, anti-democratic, and repressive,” and instead build a “humanistic, plurinational
new society” (CONAIE quoted in Becker 2012, 6). Thus the original aims of the organization
sought to rebuild conceptions of state dominance.
If CONAIE’s goal was to challenge the exclusionary state by asserting Indigenous rights,
its methods throughout the 1990s coupled popular uprisings with electoral pressure and
participation. In June 1990, CONAIE coordinated a decentralized Indigenous uprising, where
communities across the nation built road blockades that effectively shut down the entire country
for a week (Rice 2012). This uprising represented CONAIE’s emergence as a national actor. The
uprising sought recognition from the state that Ecuador was not a homogeneous nation, but
rather rooted in the profound diversity of its Indigenous groups. Although no specific political
gains were made, the uprising succeeded in drawing significant national attention.
As Indigenous groups gained greater attention from the government, their call for cultural
recognition shifted towards demanding a specific declaration naming Ecuador as a plurinational
state. Then in 1992, conservative President Sixto Durán Ballén pushed forward a neoliberal
economic reform package, which quickly sparked joint uprisings by the United Worker’s Front
and CONAIE (Becker 2012). By April of the same year, an Amazonian regional Indigenous
group led a march from Puyo to Quito in order to demand titles to their land and the formation of
a plurinational constitution. Such mobilization in the Amazon also prompted these groups to seek
reclamations for oil drilling and its ensuing human health and environmental damages. In 1993,
several Amazonian tribes jointly filed a lawsuit in New York against Texaco, highlighting how
grievances were at times aimed at both the state and international actors (Becker 2008).
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In 1994, Durán Ballén sought more neoliberal reforms, including the privatization of
water rights, increased agricultural exports, sale of state-owned lands, and most importantly, a
proposed measure that would allow communally held Indigenous lands to be sold. When Durán
Ballén ignored Indigenous disapproval, CONAIE united with other peasant groups for the
“Movilización Por La Vida” (Mobilization for Life) uprising, where decentralized road
blockades once again shut the country down for ten days. While Durán Ballén did eventually use
military force to quell the protests and still enacted many of his neoliberal policies, these
uprisings gave the struggle a reputation as the strongest Indigenous movement in Latin America
(Becker 2012). Although the movement gained much in terms of public profile from these
protests, it did not make many strides in terms of concrete policy.
In order to pursue concrete political goals, many Indigenous activists argued that
CONAIE had to enter electoral politics. In 1995, CONAIE partnered with the Coordinadora de
Movimientos Sociales (CMS, Social Movements Coordinator) to form Pachakutik, a political
party that would allow the movement to put forth its own candidates. In its first election in 1996,
Pachakutik won a surprising 20.6 percent of the presidential vote (Becker 2012). During this
election, Luis Macas, the president of CONAIE at the time, also won a post as a national deputy
in the National Assembly, running on the Pachakutik ticket. Macas’ appointment represented
Pachakutik’s first political victory (Becker 2008). By 2000, fifty-three Indigenous
representatives held local and provincial posts and four members had been elected to the 123seat Congress, after running on the Pachakutik ticket. Indigenous representatives held an
additional seven seats in the National Constitutional Assembly in 2000 (Jo-Marie 2000).
Pachakutik thus became CONAIE’s avenue for political participation.

!

32!

Mounting political pressure from these mass uprisings led to a large symbolic victory in
1998. On June 5th, Congress enacted Ecuador’s eighteenth constitution, declaring the nation to be
“pluricultural and multiethnic.” However, it did not proclaim the state to be plurinational, the
recognition Indigenous groups were demanding. For many Indigenous activists, the lack of such
a distinction represented a failure. While a pluricultural and multiethnic state recognized
Indigenous culture and ethnicity as distinct from mestizo culture, it did not acknowledge their
existence in the political order or grant specific rights in the way the term “plurinational” does
(Clark 2007). Rather than recognizing Indigenous groups’ unique standing as nationalities, the
Constitution stated that they “define themselves as nationalities” (in Becker 2012, 143). As
scholar Donna Lee Van Cott argues, CONAIE backed down from its long-term push for
plurinationalism for the recognition of certain (largely symbolic) rights (2000). These cultural
and language rights would not be specified until Ecuador’s latest Constitution in 2008. While
still largely symbolic, this declaration of Ecuador as a pluricultural state highlighted the growing
weight behind the Indigenous movement.
As it continued to grow, the Indigenous movement began to play a role in ousting
presidents. In 1997, CONAIE conducted an uprising pressuring Congress to impeach President
Abdalá Bucaram. Bucaram had introduced drastic neoliberal reforms and was notoriously
corrupt. On February 6th, the Ecuadorian Congress voted to oust Bucaram on grounds of “mental
incapacity,” placing his vice-president in power (New York Times 1997). Indigenous groups
played an even greater role in 2000, when activists led an enormous uprising to oust President
Jamil Mahuad, due to frustrations with further corruption and the worsening economic crisis.
Because the legislative path for impeachment became unclear after the 1998 ousting, Indigenous
groups formed an alliance with military officers, particularly Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez, to occupy
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Congress and overthrow the president. High ranking military officers who did not participate in
the coup turned to Congress for a legislative answer, which quickly voted to oust Jamil Mahuad
(Pérez-Liñán 2007, 183). These impeachments exemplified the height of Indigenous power at the
national level.
The 2003 elections marked a turning point for Pachakutik that ultimately began to
splinter the party. Pachakutik formed a coalition with the Partido de Sociedad Patriótica (PSP,
Patriotic Society Party) to help elect Lucio Gutiérrez as President. Upon election, however,
Gutiérrez appeared less loyal to Indigenous claims than before, and after disputes over the
unequal assignment of ministerial posts between PSP and Pachakutik leaders, Pachakutik
withdrew from the government after only six months in power. The episode served to fragment
Pachakutik and CONAIE by dividing the grassroots support that had brought the party to power
from Indigenous activists that no longer believed they could remake the political system through
participation in electoral politics. In the 2006 election, Pachakutik gained only 2.2 percent of the
votes, highlighting how the movement’s power quickly dissipated (Rice 2012).
The 2006 elections that brought Rafael Correa to power marked an interesting
development for Ecuador’s Indigenous movement. Correa’s Alianza PAÍS party utilized populist
discourse to identify with the general population, and thus began to occupy the political space
that Pachakutik and other small leftist parties had previously (Rice 2012). Despite Correa’s
mainstream support, the Indigenous movement pushed back against his regime, claiming his
populist discourse to be more lip service that actual reform. Indigenous movements, many
activists asserted, reached further than Correa in supporting the oppressed, by encouraging
communities to organize for themselves and by pursuing more radical solutions.
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Although Indigenous groups may not have supported him entirely, it was under Correa’s
regime that the long sought-after pursuit of a plurinational constitution was realized at least in
theory. For CONAIE, a plurinational state entailed “the recognition of a multicultural society
that recognized, respected, and promoted unity, equality, and solidarity among different peoples
and nationalities despite their historic, political, and cultural differences” (Becker 2012, 14-15).
In the tumultuous lead up to this new Constitution, Correa sought legal approval to rewrite the
Constitution while CONAIE led marches to push Indigenous inclusion and plurinational
recognition into the Constitution.
CONAIE’s demands for the Constitution, however, differed from the result. Under
CONAIE’s demands, Article 1 would read, “Ecuador constitutes a plurinational, sovereign,
communitarian, social and democratic, independent, secular, unitary state with gender equality”
(CONAIE 2007). The Constitutional Assembly refused to adopt this article; they did, however,
incorporate the term plurinational. Article 1 thus declared that Ecuador was a “constitutional
state of rights and justice,” and was characterized as “social, democratic, sovereign, independent,
unitary, intercultural, plurinational and secular” (Constitución de 2008). In regards to language,
the Constitution stated, “Spanish and Kichwa are the official languages for intercultural relations.
The other languages of the nationalities are official in the regions and areas of their use and
comprise part of the national culture” (Constitución de 2008). Lastly the new Constitution
included an expanded definition of collective rights, including the protection of communal
territories and resources (Becker 2012). While each of these areas represented tremendous strides
forward in terms of recognition, the practical applications of such assertions remained tenuous.
After Correa’s 2009 reelection, the regime increased spending on education and
healthcare and heeded populist calls for higher wages. However, Indigenous groups continued to
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criticize him for his “petro populism,” where he allowed oil extraction and mining in Indigenous
territories and used the revenue to fund new social programs (Becker 2012). Thus, not only had
Correa usurped the power of Indigenous social movements, but he also continued the same
exploitive practices.
Today, the debate among Ecuador’s Indigenous movement revolves around whether
electoral politics is an effective tool to achieve Indigenous self-determination and autonomy or
whether activists should push for these aims outside the existing political order. Many activists
and Indigenous scholars on the left condemn Pachakutik for seeking change from within the
system. As scholars Petras and Velmeyer argue, “Electoral politics is a game that the popular
movement cannot win, governed as it is by rules designed by and that favor the dominant class,
and that compel the movement to settle for very limited change and the illusion of power” (2005,
137). Others argue, however, that electoral politics may not be perfect, but that it is the only
practical recourse for concrete change. If Indigenous people actually want a say over their own
affairs, they argue, they must not only enter the dominant system, but make trade-offs in the
process. Former CONAIE president Luis Macas, however, refutes this idea, claiming that
Indigenous movements become weak when they are too willing to compromise on ideology to
gain government posts. He argues that while it may be necessary to engage in the dominant
social and political spheres, the movement cannot allow politicians to co-opt activists so that
they lose sight of greater goals (in Becker 2012). This fundamental debate now largely
immobilizes the movement from nationwide action. It remains to be seen whether it is indeed
possible to attain widespread, substantial change through political participation for these
communities.
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Both these cases emerged out of relatively similar circumstances. They both stem from
very resource poor groups that faced centuries of social and political marginalization. The
identity of both movements revolves around Indigeneity, a category that distinguishes these
communities from the dominant culture of their country. Each movement maintains economic,
land, and identity-based grievances and strives for autonomy over their own affairs. Lastly, both
gained strength over roughly similar time periods, a stage when the international community
turned its attention towards Indigenous groups across the globe.
Despite these similarities, notable differences between the movements still persist–
namely the divergence in movement strategy. While the Ecuadorian movement engaged in the
political system by negotiating with the state, creating a political party, and even toppling
dictators, the Zapatista movement rapidly shifted to an overall refusal of the state. In addition to
this crucial divergence, key differences exist in how these cases developed. The movement in
Ecuador, for instance, had the benefit of an established web of existing networks, created by
prior efforts to organize Indigenous groups decades before (such as networks formed by the
Catholic Church in the highlands or linkages stemming from previous class-based movements).
Organizing between Mayan villages in Chiapas, however, did not occur until the 1980s.
Furthermore, the Ecuadorian movement represented a nationwide coordination between regional
groups, whereas the Zapatista movement only existed regionally and involved a portion of
Mexico’s Indigenous population. While the Ecuadorian movement grew off of early alliances
with class-based movements, the Zapatistas have focused on gaining international alliances.
Lastly, although the Ecuadorian state utilized arrests and force to silence its Indigenous people, it
did not quite employ the same type of sustained militarization and outright murder as the
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Mexican state. These differences are key factors to understanding the development of each
movement.
If the Zapatistas shifted towards refusing Mexican state authority early in the movement,
what forms the basis for this unique tactic? How can a group with very few resources and little
political clout claim authority? Why did Ecuadorian Indigenous groups choose to engage with
the state and participate in the political process? This next chapter will delve into the logic
behind these movement tactics while exploring what it may mean to refuse state power.
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Chapter Two
The Politics of Refusal: Seeking Opportunities Under Political Constraints
In articulating and pursuing their demands for greater autonomy, both the Zapatista and
Ecuadorian Indigenous movements have worked through existing state structures and outside of
them. For the Zapatista movement, the shift from a brief armed uprising to negotiations with the
state to eventual refusal of the state’s power over their territories demonstrates their drive to
articulate a new world order, where Indigenous autonomy is safeguarded. The change from
political participation and nonviolent protest in Ecuador to the current debates over whether
working within the state can really protect Indigenous autonomy also highlights how Indigenous
leaders are grappling with how to effectively navigate state structures. In Ecuador, some scholars
and leaders are now coming to the conclusion that protecting Indigenous rights necessitates
refusing to participate in the existing political structure.
This unique rejection of state authority emerges out of the often-tense relationships
between states and Indigenous peoples. In her book Mohawk Interruptus, Audra Simpson makes
the claim that the “recognition” of Indigenous people by the state under the guise of
multiculturalism is a damaging act that places all authority in the hands of the state to articulate
Indigenous existence. State treatment of many Indigenous groups around the world has
historically been so rooted in paternalism that seemingly beneficial acts such as recognition still
carry domineering undertones. Indigenous people, however, are fighting back against such state
domination. She asserts:
There is an alternative to ‘recognition,’ the much sought-after and presumed ‘good’ of
multicultural politics. This alternative is ‘refusal’… (Indigenous people) deploy it as a
political and ethical stance that stands in stark contrast to the desire to have one’s
distinctiveness as a culture, as a people, recognized. Refusal comes with the requirement
of having one’s political sovereignty acknowledged and upheld, and raises the question
of legitimacy for those who are usually in the position of recognizing (2014, 11).
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Certainly Indigenous refusal of government recognition stands as a potent articulation against
state authority. When recognition no longer becomes a vehicle for Indigenous freedom or
dignity, but rather a means for the state to reinforce colonial relations of domination, stark
opposition questions state legitimacy. Simpson’s “refusal of recognition” is an extremely
valuable concept to understand how Indigenous groups can contest state domination despite their
disadvantaged position.
I would argue that Simpson’s “refusal” transcends recognition to apply to all
governmental actions that reinforce colonial relations by asserting the state’s supreme dominance
over Indigenous affairs. When Indigenous people invalidate state authority by repudiating its
dominance, these groups are exercising what I would term the “politics of refusal.” By
questioning state legitimacy in their assertion of Indigenous authority, these communities place
their right to self-determination on an equal or even higher level than state power. They
simultaneously assert their own legitimacy while negating state legitimacy. In this manner, the
politics of refusal is the construction of a new way of thinking, a worldview that reconceptualizes
the role of Indigenous people in society. This assertion values their unique conception of the
world and carves out spaces for it to exist. At various points through both the Zapatista and
Ecuadorian Indigenous movements, groups have trended towards the politics of refusal. Facing
political systems with few opportunities for Indigenous people, these groups had to consider
alternative means of addressing their grievances. While the Zapatistas actualized the politics of
refusal as early as 1994, the Ecuadorian Indigenous movement is now just beginning to articulate
similar ideas through discourse that emphasizes community development over political
participation.
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If both movements seek greater autonomy and Indigenous power over their own affairs,
why would the politics of refusal manifest itself as a strategy? Why would Indigenous
Ecuadorians choose to pursue political participation for the majority of the movement, only later
articulating refusal, while the Zapatista movement moved quickly to not just verbalize refusal,
but enact it through their own political structures? Why did the politics of refusal unite Mayan
groups in Mexico, yet splinter Indigenous activists in Ecuador? On a more theoretical basis, if
Indigenous groups are beginning to counteract state structures through this refusal, what does
this strategy say about the political opportunity structure? Given these developments in refusal in
Indigenous movements, can scholars maintain that these movements will evolve based on the
political opportunities and constraints embedded in state systems?
This section will seek to unpack these questions by dissecting the tactics for pursuing the
politics of refusal in the Zapatista and Ecuadorian Indigenous movements. To begin, I will
examine how political opportunities and constraints have evolved structurally in each country,
noting how these systems have excluded Indigenous people. Next, I will analyze how the
movements emerged and developed despite the constraints of their respective political systems,
and eventually sought to transcend the bounds of their political opportunity structures by
refusing state systems. These groups are not just demanding systemic change, but rather seek a
reconstructed system with room for Indigenous ideologies. On a more empirical note, I will
illustrate how the Zapatista movement turned towards the politics of refusal over political
participation (as in Ecuador) as their means towards autonomy earlier because of an overall
ineffectiveness of negotiating with the state. On the contrary, political and demographic factors
granted Indigenous Ecuadorians more impact through conventional protest methods. Overall, the
politics of refusal highlights how a group with a particular claim to sovereignty may assert their
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power in an unconventional manner, despite a lack of resources and constraints within the
political opportunity structure. The politics of refusal, therefore, is both a pertinent political tactic
when the state is unwilling to negotiate and a growing ideological force that redefines what it
means to be Indigenous.

Indigenous Political Opportunities in Mexico:
Indigenous people across Latin American have been subjected to immense oppression
since colonial contact; in Mexico, their exclusion from politics has resulted in a political
structure that was not constructed in any way for Indigenous people. During the colonial period
(1521-1821), economic and political structures were built around the exploitation of Indigenous
people. As one Spanish colonizer, Solorzano Pereira, articulated, “(T)he Indians, because of their
lack of intelligence, have to be subjected to the Spaniards as provided by the Law of Nature, the
Spaniards being the ones who will elevate them to a life of rationality” (in Vargas 1994, 17).
The Spaniards’ supposed divine right to exploit and assimilate Indigenous populations stemmed
from the notion that they were childlike, savage, and incapable of functioning for themselves.
Certainly there were Spaniards (such as Fray Bartolome de las Casas) that disputed this
narrative. However, colonial ideologies and practices created a political structure reliant on
exploitation, which would have lasting consequences to present day.
After Mexico gained its independence 1821, the new republic put forth the notion of
“legal equality,” in which criollos,2 mestizos, Africans, and Indigenous people were all
theoretically embraced as citizens. In practice, however, such legal equality proved to be entirely
symbolic, especially since the federal government was systematically dismantling Indigenous
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2!Persons!born!in!Latin!America!during!the!colonial!period!but!of!Spanish!descent.!
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communal lands at the same time. The Nationalization Act of 1856, for instance, privatized mass
sections of “idle land,” that had been held communally by Indigenous groups. Especially in
regions like Chiapas, the seized lands were not redistributed to individuals, but rather
consolidated into massive estates or latifundios held by elite criollos. Arbitrary dispossession of
land prompted Indigenous and mestizo uprisings throughout the 19th century. These revolts,
however, induced legislation intended to pacify the “barbaric Indians” by use of military force
(Vargas 1994). Thus, as the new Mexican republic developed after independence, it became clear
that the political structure was ruled by criollos and designed to inflict criollo dominance over
the Indigenous population.
The Mexican Revolution and the resulting Constitution of 1917 certainly reshaped the
nature of land distribution in the country and in theory advanced Indigenous grievances. For
instance, in his 1911 Plan de Ayala, Emiliano Zapata claimed “The immense majority of peoples
and Mexican citizens” lacked or had been disposed of their land by abuse of the Nationalization
Act. Zapata asserted the right to “expropriate these lands, hills and waters… so that the peoples
and citizens of Mexico can obtain ejidos (communal farms), colonies, public lands for villages or
(lands) for agricultural work… thus improving the prosperity and well-being of the Mexicans”
(Vargas 1994, 18).
Indigenous people acutely felt these grievances regarding land. However, since these
revolutionary demands were not articulated as having an ethnic dimension, the 1917 Constitution
did not take into account the specific desires of Indigenous people. The Constitution itself did not
even mention the words “Indigenous” or “Indian.” While it did include the idea of “social
rights,” Indigenous people were not explicitly included under these rights. Overall, the demands
that Indigenous people articulated during the Revolution were not specifically addressed. The
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Constitution only referred to communal lands obliquely in Article 27, granting “communal lands
to rural communities” (Vargas 1994, 18). Because Indigenous people were not referenced as an
ethnic group, the Constitution did not take into account the location of Indigenous groups when
drawing geographical boundaries for Mexico’s twenty-nine states and two territories in Article
43. As anthropologists now observe, no state in Mexico “responds to a criterion of ethnic identity
of some indigenous group” (Vargas 1994, 18).
Because they represent a minority in each state they live in, Indigenous people have little
electoral power in Mexico’s federal system and thus no representation in the Federal Congress
and almost none in their State Legislatures. There are no Indigenous quotas in any governmental
bodies, nor are there electoral systems in place to ensure an Indigenous voice (Vargas 1994). The
fact that the existence of Indigenous people was not even mentioned in the 1917 Constitution not
only failed to grant them rights, but also set the stage for their continued political exclusion.
Political exclusion was not the state’s only strategy towards Indigenous people through
the 20th century. Following the Revolution, the Mexican Republic began a policy of nationalism,
which sought to “Mexicanize” Indigenous people and forge a cohesive national identity.
Distinctive Indigenous identities were viewed as obstacles to national progress, and thus
education became the vehicle for acculturation. In the decades prior to the Revolution, there were
very few schools in Indigenous communities. As anthropologists and Indigenismo writers
became increasingly interested in Indigenous communities, these scholars began to highlight the
isolated and poor nature of the villages. Thus, many scholars supported the state’s efforts to
prevent “cultural stagnation” and facilitate assimilation through the creation of rural schools. The
Rural School Project (1922), Casa del Pueblo (1923), and Misiones Culturales (1925) were all
state-sanctioned institutions that created schools in Indigenous villages. In 1926, the federal
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government launched the Departamento de Incorporación Indígena (Department of Indigenous
Incorporation) and the Casa del Estudiante Indígena (House of the Indigenous Student), both of
which aimed to urbanize young Indigenous people by bringing them to Mexico City. The state
also established Centros de Educación Indígena, Indigenous boarding schools located in eleven
ethnic regions. These policies were tremendously successful in terms of state-building initiatives;
by just 1924, there were 1,417 rural schools in Indigenous communities (Gutiérrez 1999).
However, it is crucial to recognize that these schools were not merely neutral devices, but rather
employed harsh assimilationist policies. They intended to strip Indigenous people of their
cultural practices and ideologies and instill a sense of shame for speaking their native languages.
Despite recent cultural revival efforts, this period of internalized cultural shame would continue
through generations to undermine the foundations of many Indigenous cultures.
By the 1940s, the assimilation paradigm shifted slightly, and the idea of respecting
Indigenous cultures while still integrating them into the dominant culture became the goal. In the
last year of his presidency (1940), Lázaro Cárdenas held the Inter-American Indigenous
Congress, in which he began to shift the rhetoric surrounding Indigenous policy. At the opening
address, Cárdenas stated, “What must be supported is the incorporation of the Indian into the
universal culture, that is to say, to promote the development of the race, the improvement of their
living conditions by introducing universal technology, science and art; but always on the basis of
maintaining the Indians’ racial personality and showing respect for their consciousness and
identity” (Cárdenas 1940, 138). Although Cárdenas’ statement takes a step towards respect for
identity, he still ultimately assumes the existence of a universal (western) culture that Indigenous
groups should aspire to. Since assimilation and building state-cohesion was still the aim, one can
imagine that respect for culture was still largely symbolic.
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Cárdenas did create the Instituto Nacional Indígena (INI, National Indigenous Institute),
which was the first formally governmental organization “having the aim of integrating the
indigenous communities into the economic, political and social life of the nation” (INI, in
Gutiérrez 1999, 98). What the government deemed best for communities, however, was certainly
was not always beneficial in Indigenous peoples’ eyes. For Cárdenas and the following
administrations, respecting Indigenous identity entailed appropriating certain aspects of their
culture, particularly art, as representations of general Mexican culture. In this manner, aspects of
Indigeneity gained visibility in Mexican culture, but without any Indigenous say over this
appropriation. Indigenous weavers, for instance, gained little from the mass sale of products
using their techniques, feeding into the idea that “Mexico should use the Indian cultures in order
to enrich the national one” (INI 1978 quoted in Gutiérrez 1999, 97). Celebrating Indigenous
culture symbolically still resulted in no tangible political or economic gains for these
communities.
It was not until the 1970s that the government’s assimilationist stance started to shift to a
more pluriethnic ideology. As scholars began to denounce the Mexican state’s homogenizing
policies, increasing pressure mounted for the government to redefine their approach towards
Indigenous people. Inspired by Indigenous conferences pushing for plurinational reform in South
America,3 in 1975, The First Council of Indigenous Peoples met to put forth a formal request for
a pluriethnic society. Pluralism, however, was not legally instated into the Constitution until two
decades later. In 1992, President Salinas de Gortari heeded Indigenous demands and mounting
political pressure by amending Article 4 of the Constitution. The new paragraph read:
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3!In!1971,!Indigenous!representatives!met!for!the!Fricción!Interétnica!de!América!del!Sur!noRAndina!
(Interethnic!Friction!in!NonRAndean!South!America)!and!produced!the!Barbados!Declaration,!which!
denounced!nationRbuilding,!homogenizing!projects.!In!1978,!a!second!workshop!involved!Mexican!
organizations!and!social!scientists.!The!conference!generated!the!Barbados!Declaration!II,!calling!for!plurality!
in!national!agendas!across!Latin!America!(Gutiérrez!1999).!!!!!!
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The Mexican nation has a pluriethnic composition originally based on its indigenous
peoples. The law shall protect and promote the development of their languages, cultures,
uses, customs, resources and specific forms of social organization, guaranteeing to their
individual members an effective access of the jurisdiction of the State. In the agrarian
suits and proceedings in which those members are a party, their legal practices and
customs shall be taken into account in terms established by the law (quoted in Vargas
1994, 39).
At the time, this legal change marked a resounding political success for Indigenous groups in
Mexico and across Latin America.
Despite the above claims on behalf of Indigenous people, communities continue to push
for specific legislation that will detail their rights. To exacerbate the lack of specificity, there is
no legal definition for who an Indigenous person is under Mexican law. Mexican “legal equality”
means that all Mexican citizens are technically considered equal in the eyes of the law, and thus
the law does not need to differentially identify its citizens (Vargas 1994). However, how can the
state be held accountable to protect “the development of their languages, cultures, uses, customs,
resources and specific forms of social organization” for its Indigenous communities if it is not
even legally defined who Indigenous people are? Given the amorphous nature of Indigeneity,
where certain mestizo populations might choose to emphasize their Indigenous heritage, a legal
definition of Indigeneity might exclude these people, perhaps problematically so. Additionally, a
state delineation of what constitutes Indigeneity would represent another example of external
forces deciding who Indigenous people are and how they should behave. Despite the problems a
legal definition would carry, the lack of one leads to a deficiency in implementation of the rights
outlined in Article 4.
While Indigenous people have made significant strides in at least rhetorical recognition
from the state, as in Article 4 above, their actual political avenues for addressing grievances
remain slim. Out of Mexico’s 500 lower house legislators, only 14 were seats held by Indigenous
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people in the 2012-2015 term (United Nations Development Program 2013). Mexico does not
have reserved quotas, voluntary quotas, or specific appointments for Indigenous people in the
legislature. The fact that most Indigenous groups are divided among multiple states makes it
even harder to elect representatives. As a survey conducted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union
finds, the legislature in Mexico has a proportionally low number of Indigenous people. The study
attributes this trend to poor voter registration and participation (particularly in rural areas), party
resistance and discrimination against Indigenous candidates, the lack of impact that Indigenous
representatives have historically had on Indigenous peoples’ lives, and general lack of
confidence in national decision-making (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2014, 6). With a lack of
formal representative, avenues for addressing grievances within state structures remain slim.
Thus, the historical construction of a political system that exploited and excluded Indigenous
people has not ceased to do so because of its pluralistic discourse.

Indigenous Political Opportunities in Ecuador:
The Ecuadorian political structure has similarly been constructed in a manner that
excludes full Indigenous participation. Relations during the colonial period between Ecuadorian
criollo populations and Indigenous people followed similar patterns as in Mexico. Indigenous
people were legally considered wards of the state and inferior to criollo (American-born) and
peninsular (European-born) whites. This legalized notion of inferiority set the state for colonial
exploitation. The Spanish Crown, however, had varying policies for “dealing” with Ecuador’s
Andean and Amazonian Native peoples. In the Andean region, the Crown forcefully organized
Indigenous groups into peasant communities that were allowed a limited degree of selfgovernment, provided they fulfill periodic labor services to Spanish officials and pay a per capita
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tribute. In the Amazon, the Spanish aim was more to pacify Indigenous “barbarians” through
military garrison and missions (Peña 2005). It is important to note that not all Indigenous groups
(like the Huaorani) came into direct contact with Spanish officials and settlers. Nevertheless, the
overall policy of colonialism in Ecuador also set the stage for continued exploitation.
As Ecuador gained independence in 1822, the new state was faced with how to define
Indigenous relations going forward. Similar to Mexico, a year before official independence, the
state enacted Article 181 of the Law of 1821, which eliminated all honorific titles granted by the
Crown and granted all Ecuadorians (including Indigenous people) equal citizenship before the
law. The Law of 1821 also compelled Indigenous people to relinquish their communal lands to
the heads of their families, with excess lands auctioned to criollos (Sattar 2007). This policy
eradicated legal communal ownership of land by transferring ownership to one Indigenous leader
rather than the community. Although the mandatory Indigenous tribute had been eliminated for a
period of time, it was quickly reinstated as Ecuador separated from Gran Colombia and found
itself in significant debt. By 1830, Indigenous tribute accounted for 28-35 percent of all state
revenue (Sattar 2007, 25). Despite their significant contribution to revenue and their supposed
“legal equality” under Ecuadorian citizenship, Indigenous groups were still legally defined as
minors, and official state discourse referred to them as the “raza miserable” (miserable race) that
required state protection. This paradox in Ecuadorian law proclaimed on the national level that
all Ecuadorian (including Indigenous people) were equal, but on local scales, they were defined
as holding a distinct political, social and judicial status, which was seen as inferior and thus
subjected them to a number of exploitative laws (Sattar 2007).
By the 1850s, the notion of Indigenous people requiring greater state protection began to
dissipate. In 1854, the Institution of Indian Protectors, which had previously mediated between
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Indigenous individuals and the state in court (since Indigenous people were not allowed to
represent themselves in court or sign contracts), was abolished. Article 2 in the Law of 1854
stated that the institution was “clearly in contradiction to democratic ideals” (Sattar 2007, 34).
The rhetoric of the period also led to the abolition of the Indigenous tribute. Although the end of
this policy may seem beneficial, its elimination removed certain aspects of Indigenous
autonomy. Their individual monetary contribution to the state was replaced by labor obligations,
especially constructing and maintaining roads that legally applied to all Ecuadorian citizens, but
was disproportionately applied to Indigenous people. Additionally, the policy left communal
lands much more vulnerable to state exploitation, as they lost certain protections that came with
the tribute (Sattar 2007). While shifting away from certain paternalistic state policies, the state
continued to threaten Indigenous land and autonomy.
The Liberal Revolution of 1895 brought with it a new conception of the Indigenous role
in society. As mentioned, the Indigenismo movement across Latin America brought
anthropologists and writers who sought to understand the Indigenous “other” in order to help
facilitate their “modernization.” As coastal populations overthrew the conservative regime of
Luis Cordero and instated Eloy Alfaro, many Indigenous groups joined this liberal uprising. As
previously mentioned, many local officials exploited Indigenous populations, using Indigenous
legally obliged labor services as justification to transform them into personal servants. To avoid
these legal obligations to state labor, many Indigenous people worked on latifundios. However,
various forms of bondage and debt peonage prevented individuals from leaving these estates,
further entrenching Indigenous people in a system of semi-forced labor (Baud 2007). For many,
the Liberal Revolution provided an avenue for addressing these grievances. Alfaro seemed to
turn toward Indigenous grievances in the Reglamentación del concertaje of April 12, 1899,
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which read, “The Constitution obliges the public powers to protect the Indian race in order to
improve its social situation… (It) prohibits slavery in the territory of the republic” (Baud 2007,
79). This declaration on the national level once again did not guarantee compliance on the local
level, as powerful landowners and local officials were capable of evading much of this
progressive legislation. The courts were often filled with complaints from Indigenous people
reporting abuses by landlords, priests, and local officials (Baud 2007). The discrepancy between
legal discourse and local action is a continued theme throughout Mexican and Ecuadorian
political history.
After decades of local corruption and inability to implement federal decrees for
Indigenous rights, Indigenous people joined a mass uprising of workers, peasants and students in
the 1944 Glorious May Revolution, resulting in the overthrow of President Carlos Arroyo del
Rio. These organizing efforts culminated in a Constituent Assembly and Ecuador’s fifteenth
constitution. The assembly met for months, debating how to define Ecuadorian nationalism
going forward. A few leftist voices in the assembly began to argue that the Ecuadorian state had
been used as an instrument to perpetuate exploitation, but they did not necessarily come to this
conclusion in terms of the treatment of Indigenous people (Becker 2007).
As a result, the Constitution of 1945 did not grant Indigenous people the right to vote, nor
did it offer them other practical rights of citizenship. Indigenous people would not gain the right
to vote until 1980, highlighting how they have been excluded from the political process. Due to
fears of more uprising, the Constitution did create a system of functional representation where
congressional seats were reserved for certain “minority” groups. Given that Indigenous people
actually represented a majority of the population at that time and that special interest groups–
such as professors, merchants, the military, agriculturalists and the press were also guaranteed
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representation– these quotas were hardly substantial. While special interest groups could select
their representatives, Indigenous people were deemed incapable of doing so. The Constitution
also created the Federación Ecuatoriana de los Indios as the first governmental organization for
Indigenous affairs. It too, however, was run solely by non-Indigenous elites. Thus, as scholar
Marc Becker notes, “Elites continued to control state structures to their own benefit” (2007,
114).
In the late 1970s and 1980s, the idea of pluriculturalism emerged in Ecuador as an idea
that would form the basis of Indigenous goals for the following decades. In 1979, the
Constitution Assembly extended the right to vote to illiterate people, which finally included a
substantial portion of the Indigenous population. The same year marked a transition to
democratic rule, with the election of Jaime Roldós. Roldós was also the first president to include
a passage in Kichwa in his inaugural speech and ultimately set the stage for symbolic appeals to
Indigenous people. His presidency brought discourse regarding pluriculturalism – the respect and
recognition of Indigenous groups as a key piece of national development – to a federal level. For
the first time, the state engaged in dialogues with Indigenous leaders. As Amalia Pallares notes,
“Pluriculturalism thus demanded a focus on the specific character, or distinctiveness, of
indigenous culture from white-mestizo culture” (2007, 145). Especially in terms of bilingual and
bicultural education, this period marked a turning point in the state’s willingness to recognize
Indigenous groups.
Although pluricultural reforms had been institutionalized through literacy campaigns and
bicultural education by the late 1980s, the socioeconomic status of Indigenous groups had not
improved. In response, Indigenous groups once again began to mobilize, eventually leading to
the formation of regional groups and later CONAIE. Despite pluricultural policies, these groups
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argued that Indigenous people still lacked political participation, their material demands were
ignored, and the celebratory discourse of multiculturalism did not result in substantial change.
For these Indigenous activists, pluriculturalism extended beyond recognition to cultural rights,
economic rights, and political participation, or what can be termed a more “plurinational”
approach. These demands were based on control over land and the right to self-determination,
goals which underlie the movement today.
Overall, the evolution from colonial suppression to at least some pluricultural recognition
has not been linear. Like in Mexico, Indigenous state-relations in Ecuador may have improved,
but the political system historically was constructed explicitly and deliberately to exclude these
populations. Exclusion embedded within the political system does not disappear, even over
generations, without deconstructing the policies that have lead to such marginalization.

Open versus Closed Political Systems:
While historically Indigenous groups in Mexico and Ecuador have been politically
excluded, it nevertheless remains vital to examine the political structures in each state today.
Social movement scholars, especially those focused on structural explanations, often distinguish
between open and closed political systems. The relative openness of a political system not only
determines governmental responsiveness, but many scholars argue that it can also affect the
strategies that the movement pursues. For instance, if political systems are open, movements may
seek to work through institutional systems rather than pursuing disruptive tactics (such as large
protests) (Caraway 2006; Kitschelt 1986). It is thus useful to compare the present openness of
political systems in Ecuador and Mexico to determine whether small variations in political
opportunities indeed contributed to the differences in strategy across movements.
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As noted, in his 1986 article focusing on European democracies, Herbert Kitschelt begins
to expand the political opportunity structure by taking into account not just the political system’s
responsiveness to a movement, but also its ability to enact change. Kitschelt combines these two
factors to develop four indicators that determine a system’s openness to political demands: 1) the
number of political parties or groups with electoral demands 2) the capacity of the legislature to
control policy independently of the executive 3) the relationships between various interest groups
and the executive (more fluid and pluralistic linkages create a more responsive government) 4)
mechanisms that aggregate demands into policy. To actually output this responsiveness into
policy, however, Kitschelt puts forth three additional indicators: 1) the nature of centralization in
decision-making 2) governmental control over the market (the more control it maintains, the
more difficult it is to challenge existing norms) 3) the independence of the judiciary (1986, 6364).
These indicators are certainly extensive and provide useful insight into examining the
role of political structures. However, for the purposes of this work, they can be simplified into
overall trends. In a discussion of transnational activism, Teri Caraways asserts that a country’s
degree of democracy (measured by free and fair elections, enforcement of rule of law, and
respect for human rights), the presence and effectiveness of NGOs, and the ability to circulate
information, determines political openness (2006).
In the Mexican and Ecuadorian cases, a combination of these ideas proves most useful.
First, the electoral process remains crucial to governmental obligation to its constituency. Fair
and free elections have not always been the norm in either country, and thus the electoral process
deserves scrutiny. Secondly, Kitschelt’s indicators emphasize independence in various spheres
from the executive. By analyzing political pluralism, freedom of expression, judicial processes,
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and overall corruption, we gain a greater sense of the degree of executive control. Lastly, the
degree of organizational rights not only provides insight into NGO capacity, but also helps
illustrate the state’s tendency to shut down movements.
2015 Comparison of Political Openness in Mexico and Ecuador4

Indicator!of!
Open/!
Closed!System!!
Electoral!Process!

Mexico!!

Ecuador!!

R

R

R
R
R
R
R
R
R

Political!
Pluralism!!

R
R
R
R
R

Government!
Effectiveness!!

R
R
R

President!elected!6Ryear!term,!no!
reelection!!
128R!member!Senate!elected!through!mix!
of!direct!voting!and!proportional!
representation!!
500R!member!Chamber!of!Deputies!!
Recent!reform!bars!current!members!of!
Congress!from!reelection!!
Elected!governors!have!significant!
authority,!especially!over!police!forces!
2012!presidential!election:!allegations!of!
vote!buying,!media!bias,!manipulations!of!
polls,!overspending!!
Federal!Electoral!Institute!oversees!
elections,!seen!as!fair!
Allegations!of!abuses!of!public!resources!
at!the!state!level!persist!!
Few!official!restrictions!on!political!
organization!!
Three!major!political!parties!!
Many!states!with!fewer!parties,!more!
prone!to!municipal!and!stateRlevel!
corruption!!
More!than!12!small!town!candidates!killed!
between!2010!and!2013!!
Indigenous!groups!underrepresented!in!
political!institutions!!
Organized!crime!limiting!effective!
governing!!
Public!sector!employees!(such!as!
teachers)!prone!to!extortion!in!some!
regions!!
Allegations!that!illegal!drug!money!

R
R
R

R
R
R

R
!
R
R

President!elected!4Ryear!term,!one!
reelection!
137R!member!unicameral!National!
Assembly,!elected!by!each!province!
Organization!of!American!States!reports!
elections!to!be!free!
2012!reform!to!seat!allocation!now!favors!
larger!parties!!

Few!restrictions!on!political!organization!
!Four!major!political!parties!
2008!constitution!required!reregistration!
of!all!political!organizations,!allegedly!
misrepresenting!support!for!each!
organization!
Women!must!account!for!50%!of!party!
lists!in!national!legislative!elections.!!
Lack!of!investigative!capacity!into!
government!activities,!prone!to!
corruption!
Transparency!and!Social!Control!branch!
of!government!oversees!corruption,!had!
64!corruption!cases!in!2013!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4!Table!information!from!Freedom

House. 2016. “Ecuador.” Freedom of the World.
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/ecuador;
Freedom House. 2016. “Mexico.” Freedom of the World. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/mexico.
Transparency International. 2016. “How Corrupt Is Your Country?” Accessed February 7.
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/infographic.
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R
R

Freedom!of!
Expression!

R
R
R

corrupt!politicians,!especially!on!state!
level!!
Prosecution!of!corrupt!officials!difficult!
Mexico!ranked!103!out!of!175!countries!in!
Transparency!International’s!2014!
Corruptions!Perceptions!Index,!with!a!
score!of!35!out!of!100!!!!
Broadcast!media!controlled!entirely!by!
two!major!corporations,!one!accused!of!
overtly!supporting!specific!candidates!!
Since!2006,!reporters!can!face!high!risk!of!
physical!harm!if!dealing!with!sensitive!
subjects!!
Internet!not!restricted,!but!instances!of!
cartels!targeting!online!reporters!!

R

Ecuador!ranked!110!out!of!175!countries!
in!Transparency!International’s!2014!
Corruptions!Perceptions!Index,!with!a!
score!of!33!out!of!100!!

R

Harassment!against!journalists,!human!
rights!group!Fundamedios!reported!253!
cases!of!abuse!against!journalists!in!2014.!
National!broadcasts!used!to!condemn!
opposition!leaders!!
Government!maintains!unlimited!access!
to!public!service!airtime!
After!two!journalists!sued!Correa!for!his!
response!to!a!2010!police!revolt,!they!
were!imprisoned!for!18!months.!!
Organic!Law!on!Communications!placed!
executive!control!on!journalists!and!
media!outlets,!and!created!media!
regulatory!bodies!controlled!by!the!
executiveR!criticized!by!human!rights!
groups!as!placing!excessive!executive!
control!on!media!!
2013!criminal!code!restricts!freedom!of!
expression!and!seeks!to!give!government!
greater!regulatory!powers!!
Government!employs!private!firm!to!
remove!sensitive!videos!from!internet!!
Academic!freedom!and!freedom!of!
religion!generally!unrestricted.!!
National!security!legislation!maintains!a!
broad!definition!of!terrorism,!which!has!
been!extended!to!acts!against!unarmed!
protestors!!
In!2013,!a!teacher!was!given!an!eightR
year!prison!sentence!for!encouraging!her!
students!to!protest!!
Right!to!organize!guaranteed!by!law,!but!
NGOs!under!increasing!governmental!
scrutiny!!
2011!presidential!decree!limited!capacity!
of!foreignRsponsored!NGOs!
2013!presidential!decree!made!process!of!
forming!an!NGO!difficult!and!gave!
executive!power!to!dissolve!
organizations.!
Judiciary!comprised!of!21Rmember!
National!Court!of!Justice!and!9Rmember!
Constitutional!Court!
Lack!of!transparency!in!appointment!of!
judges,!concerns!that!judges!align!too!
closely!with!government!

R
R
R
R

R
R
R

Organizational!
Rights!!

R
R

Constitutional!protection!for!free!
assembly,!but!civic!expression!restricted!
in!some!regions!
Nongovernmental!organizations!active,!
but!have!received!threats!and!violent!
resistance!!

R

R
R
R
R

Justice!System!!
!

R
R
R
R
R

!

Vague!definition!of!organized!crime!
impedes!prosecution!
Coordination!on!law!enforcement!weak!
Officers!prone!to!bribery!and!corruption!
2013:!Sentences!issued!on!less!that!2%!of!
registered!murders!!
Reported!military!abuses!!

R
R
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The above table provides the details for a comparison of these indicators between Mexico
and Ecuador. While key differences persist between them, the overall lack of political openness
in both cases overwhelms smaller differences. Slight variations, however, may prove useful in
explaining divergence in strategies. First, while the electoral process does not appear entirely
free of corruption in either country, Mexico has received more allegations of electoral
corruption. Neither country restricts political pluralism, but in practice both trend towards larger,
more powerful party systems (Freedom House 2016). In Mexico, less pluralism on the state and
municipal levels leaves more power for governors and more space for corruption. Both countries
experience high levels of general corruption, although Ecuador currently ranks slightly more
corrupt (with a score of 32) than Mexico (with a score of 35) on Transparency International’s
2015 Corruptions Perceptions Index (2016). In Mexico, corruption is more frequent on state or
municipal levels, and more often tied to organized crime than in Ecuador. Although expression is
not entirely free in either country, harassment of journalists and censorship is currently a more
pressing issue in Ecuador. While few corporations control the airtime in Mexico, the Ecuadorian
government is increasingly restricting broadcasting in Ecuador (Freedom House 2016). This tie
between government and the media epitomizes an environment where new demands would not
gain traction.
Organizational rights also highlight differences between Mexico and Ecuador.
Organizations straying from government ideology are certainly not free from intimidation and
sometimes violence in Mexico. However, in Ecuador the executive has recently focused on
suppressing NGOs, as demonstrated by the aforementioned imprisonments and presidential
decrees. Lastly, the justice system maintains its respective issues in each case. In Mexico,
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organized crime impedes prosecution, poor coordination between national and local police forces
leads to corruption, and the Mexican military has been criticized for human rights abuses. In
Ecuador, the tie between the judiciary and the executive is suspect and speaks to overall
executive power (Freedom House 2016).
Such characteristics of these political systems speak more of general political problems
than specific attempts to exclude Indigenous people, yet they affect Indigenous groups as much
as any other community. Despite minor variations, these systems are more similar than different
in that both are only partially free systems that are relatively closed to Indigenous people. When
the electoral process is not entirely free and fair, political parties are few, corruption of local and
national officials is prevalent, expression is limited, organization is suppressed and the justice
system is flawed, it becomes difficult to articulate new demands. These elements are prevalent in
both cases. Separation between the executive and other aspects of the state is key to an open
system. Such separation exists formally in both countries, but in practice corruption subverts it.
In Mexico, the connection between government officials (especially local officials), organized
crime, the media, police forces, and the election process can be particularly strong. Ties between
these groups create an environment where demands outside of what this block deems appropriate
can be particularly dangerous. Similarly in Ecuador, the executive has gained increased control
over expression, the judicial process, and nongovernmental entities, which likewise creates a
difficult environment for new demands. Above all else, these connections create high potential
for various forms of corruption, which makes both recognizing new demands and enacting laws
to address them exceedingly difficult.
In addition to present freedoms, it is necessary to consider the changes in political and
civil rights over time. As the following figures demonstrate, overall rights in Mexico and
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Ecuador have shifted over time. In the early 1990s when these movements were both beginning
to gain traction, Ecuador maintained better political and civil rights than Mexico, according to
Freedom House’s Freedom in the World rankings. Greater rights from the start of the movement
likely swayed groups towards engaging with the state and perhaps even towards participating in
the electoral process. In 1996 when Pachakutik was formed, political rights in Ecuador were
rated at 2 out of 7 (with 7 as the least rights and 1 as the most) with civil liberties at 3,
highlighting how engaging with state systems seemed viable for Indigenous groups in Ecuador.
However, as political and civil rights in Mexico began to improve in the 2000s, rights in Ecuador
declined (Freedom House 2007). Perhaps this regression of rights in Ecuador contributed to
Pachakutik’s lack of success later on and the overall fragmentation of the movement.

Political and Civil Rights in Ecuador and Mexico, 1980-20065

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5!Charts!from!Freedom

House: Himmelsbach, Raffael. 2007. “Freedom in the Americas Today.” www.freedomhouse.org.
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In addition to civil and political rights, differences in the party systems in each country
helped Ecuadorian Indigenous groups engage in the political system more directly. In Mexico,
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) held executive control and a majority in Congress for
71 years, ending in 2000. Mexico’s supposed two-party system in practice was a one-party reign
during the time the Zapatista movement emerged. Even organized political parties with a broad
base of support, such as the National Action Party (PAN), could not substantially contest the
PRI. Such a political environment was certainly not conducive to an Indigenous political party.
In contrast, Ecuador’s highly fragmented party system, exacerbated by political and economic
divisions among elites, meant that the Ecuadorian movement did not have to confront one ruling
party. Rather, constant shifts in political power in Ecuador have made it possible for a small
minority party like Pachakutik to have at least some political sway (Jo-Marie 2000).
While variations in parties and political and civil rights between the two countries have
swayed each movement towards a tendency to refuse or engage with the state, they do not tell the
whole story. For instance, in Mexico, the Zapatista movement emerged in 1994 at a time when
political and civil liberties remained at 4, or comparatively low. The Zapatistas shifted from
!
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negotiating with the state (while pressing for the San Andrés Accords) to the politics of refusal
while political and civil rights remained low. However, as rights steadily increased in the early
2000s, the Zapatistas did not return to significantly negotiate with the state. Had their tactics
been solely premised on the political opportunities available, it seems this new trends toward
democracy in Mexico would have prompted greater negotiation. Instead democratization
accompanied further refusal from the movement.
Certain scholars argue that these political structures in Mexico and Ecuador would set the
range of likely protest activities for movements. Peter Eislinger (1973), for instance, contends
that in closed systems, mobilization is limited due to fear of repression, while in open systems,
protestors tend to take advantage of more institutionalized avenues (Tarrow 2011). While
differences in political and civil rights may have allowed the Ecuadorian movement to engage
with the state more than the Zapatistas, political factors did not entirely dictate movement tactics.
In these cases, both movements faced systems that were not entirely free and remained relatively
closed to Indigenous people. Despite the repressive nature of both states (as exhibited by
corruption and violence perpetrated by both states), substantial mobilization nevertheless arose in
both cases. Eislinger’s characterization of closed political systems would not predict these trends.
Because it begins to expand beyond the purely structural approach, Kitschelt’s framework
provides a key foundation to better understand the relevance and limitations of the political
opportunity structure for these Indigenous movements.
If movement tactics at least somewhat depend on the relative openness of the political
system, closed structures with less political and civil rights lead to more provocative strategies.
As Kitschelt argues, “When political systems are closed and have considerable capacities to ward
off threats to the implementation of policies, movements are likely to adopt confrontational,
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disruptive strategies orchestrated outside established policy channels” (1986, 66). This
characterization appears accurate both in the Zapatista and Ecuadorian Indigenous movements.
Disruptive or confrontational strategies include the armed occupation, marches, road blockades
and organized protests that have occurred throughout both movements. The fact that the
Zapatista movement began with an armed occupation of San Cristobal de las Casas highlights
how in a closed political system, tactics that force the government to respond may be a group’s
only viable option. This trend may be especially true given Indigenous peoples’ historical
exclusion from political avenues in both states.
While a closed political system influences movement strategies, Kitschelt notes how it
also can impede the impact a movement is able to make. He characterizes demands as either
procedural (seeking new channels of participation), substantive (changing specific policies), or
structural (changing the political opportunity structure itself). The movements in Ecuador and
Mexico have sought a combination of these demands at various points throughout their struggles.
Kitschelt, however, notes that while open regimes more willingly accept new groups, closed
systems have no incentive to do so, since “policy-making is the prerogative of a circumscribed
cartel of political actors” (1986, 67). If fixed linkages already exist between different spheres of
the state (such as the media and the executive in both countries), new alliances become
challenging. When successful policy or procedural shifts are difficult to obtain in closed systems,
groups trend towards more structural demands. Kitschelt notes, “Structural impacts will figure
when a political system cannot bring about either procedural or substantive reforms. In this
instance, a social movement will try to broaden its demands to include those for altering the
existing political system fundamentally” (1986, 67). This dynamic also applies to the Zapatista
and Ecuadorian movements. After limited success with procedural and substantive aspects of
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their overall push for autonomy, these movements have begun to seek an altered political
structure.
Thus far, the political opportunity structure appears to substantially explain both
movement strategies and their demands. In a simplistic account, the closed political structures in
each country caused both movements to pursue disruptive tactics and evolve to more structural
demands. This story, however, does not fully explain the variation in strategies between the
movements. Nor does it take into account that these movements, particularly the Zapatistas, went
beyond just disruptive strategies to active refusal of the state and its systems. This politics of
refusal, as previously termed, demanded not just to alter the existing political structures, but to
fundamentally rebuild a new system. While Kitschelt gets at how groups may evolve from
focusing on one policy to focusing on the whole political structure, this paper takes it a step
further. Although in different ways, both movements have shifted from focusing on the entire
political structure to reimagining a completely new system.
Kitschelt’s argument is useful in understanding some developments of the movement and
how the political structure played a role, but it comes up short in terms of explaining the politics
of refusal. What, then, does this say about the relevance of the political opportunity structure in
these cases? Understanding the politics of refusal requires more than the political opportunity
structure as an explanatory factor. For this key tactic, employed in the Zapatista case (but also
articulated in the Ecuadorian movement), Albert Hirschman’s book Exit, Voice and Loyalty
provides a relevant framework. Although Hirschman constructs his analysis through an
economic lens, he makes the argument that in any firm, corporation, institution, or even state,
participants learn to live with a certain level of dysfunctional conduct. However, once this
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undesirable behavior reaches a certain threshold, members choose to voice their grievances, exit
the organization, or maintain their loyalty (1970).
Hirschman’s fairly straightforward argument takes an interesting turn when applied to the
politics of refusal. Hirschman argues that “exit” is a strategy that applies to economics, while
“voice” is employed in politics. Hirschman explores exit as a strategy used when consumers are
dissatisfied with a product and thus choose to purchase from another company. In our cases,
however, exit can actually be a tactic used against the state. Hirschman describes exit as a
uniquely powerful option where “in some situations, exit will be a reaction of last resort after
voice has failed” (1970, 37). This characterization is accurate in both Indigenous movements.
While both movements have certainly “voiced” their grievances, dissatisfaction with the
outcomes (such as the failed San Andres Accords in Mexico or the emptiness of the plurinational
constitution in Ecuador) has led to a tendency towards refusing the state, rather than working
within it. The politics of refusal can therefore be viewed as a unique form of exit.
When applying exit to social movements and the state, it can be both strategic and
symbolic. The politics of refusal (exit in our case) symbolically asserts Indigenous power and
seeks to construct a new system, which aims to strategically undermine state authority. However,
in delegitimizing state power, the politics of refusal indirectly pressures the government to
reimagine the nation-state structure. In this manner, exit is an assertion of power that rejects the
state while not completely leaving it behind, since groups have not abandoned the hope to
change the state system.
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The Politics of Refusal as a Tactic:
The politics of refusal, as employed in the Zapatista case and articulated in the
Ecuadorian case, can be viewed as both a tactic for gaining leverage against the state and a
means of building an ideology that rejects an exclusionary state. In this manner, the politics of
refusal is both a tactic and a principle. Why has it emerged as a tactic? Is there strategic value in
refusing the state?
To answer this question, it is useful to compare the tactics employed in each case at
various points in the movement, as represented in the diagram below. As noted in the key, the
diagram compares five categories of tactics used over the course of each movement. Dynamic
campaigns refer to either armed or unarmed disruptive tactics intended to gain attention and
pressure the state. Examples include marches, road blockades, nonviolent uprising, and armed
take-overs. Negotiation with the state refers to attempts made between the movement and the
government to either establish relations or implement some of the movement’s demands.
Political participation entails actions that seek to gain an increased role in the existing political
affairs of the state. Transnational linkage represents efforts to gain international attention to
support the campaign. Lastly, the politics of refusal refers to a rejection of the existing political
structure and an attempt to somehow refashion a new order.
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As the above diagram demonstrates, Ecuador has largely pursued a combination of
dynamic campaigns and political participation through the bulk of the movement. As the
campaign toppled and put forth political leaders (with mixed results), it simultaneously built a
base of public pressure through dynamic campaigns. The Zapatista movement, on the other hand
has pursued a more varied mix of dynamic campaigns, refusal, and transnational linkage, with a
few negotiations with the state early on. Most significantly, the Zapatistas employed the politics
of refusal as early as December 1994 with the creation of its own government. By comparison,
the only action by the Ecuadorian Indigenous movement that fully represents refusal is
Pachakutik’s withdrawal from governmental posts after not achieving the desired results through
political participation. Refusal in the Ecuadorian movement now mainly comes through debate
and discourse, as activists such as Luis Macas (former CONAIE president), debate the
effectiveness of engaging with the state. Thus, while the Zapatista movement was able to turn
towards the politics of refusal early on, the Ecuadorian movement recently made that shift. For
the purposes of this work, this is the most significant difference in tactics between the
movements.
So why turn to refusing the state? If one examines the above diagram, it becomes clear
that these groups turn to refusal when other options dwindle. Limited success in procedural
(increased political participation) and substantive (policy-based) demands leads movements to
think more structurally (Kitschelt 1986). They begin to address the political system as a whole.
In Mexico, when local, policy-based demands related to the privatization of communal
Indigenous lands failed, groups turned to structural changes through the San Andrés Accords.
When Amazonian groups in Ecuador continued to face the detrimental effects of oil drilling, they
strayed from focusing on individual policies and joined the movement for a plurinational
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constitution. These structural demands, however, also failed to achieve their desired impact. The
San Andrés Accords were ultimately not implemented in Mexico, and Ecuador’s 2008
plurinational constitution differed significantly from what CONAIE envisioned. If structural
demands continually fail, what options are left for groups who have been systemically excluded
from the political world? Refusal. Put more simply under Hirschman’s framework, refusal or
“exit” comes as a last resort after “voice” has failed.
The divergence in movement tactics between the Zapatistas and the Ecuadorian
Indigenous movement thus can be attributed to differing levels of success in more conventional
methods. The Zapatista originally turned to refusal earlier due to the ineffectiveness of other
options, while the Ecuadorian movement experienced more successes through political
participation and disruptive campaigns. In Mexico, the most significant sign that negotiations
with the state were failing (from the Zapatista) perspective was the government’s rejection of the
San Andrés Accords. In the “Sixth Declaration of The Lacandon Jungle” in 2005, the EZLN
articulates this disappointment. The declaration asserts, “In these agreements the bad government
said that, yes, they are going to recognize the rights of Mexican Indian communities and they are
going to respect their culture, and they are going to make it law in the Constitution. But, after
they had signed them, the bad government forgot about them, and many years passed and they
never implemented these agreements” (EZLN 2005, 2, my translation). This structural attempt at
reform failed relatively early in the movement, leaving the Zapatistas with few options aside
from pursuing the same strategies with no results. They could continue to pressure the
government to actually implement the accords, but in this political system, pressure from
Indigenous groups did not appear effective. Or, they could refuse the government’s authority. As
the Sixth Declaration describes, “The EZLN then decided to implement the San Andrés Accords,
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just by one side (or what they call ‘unilaterally’)” (EZLN 2005, 3, my translation). In other
words, they refuted the government’s authority to validate their rights and thus decided to
implement the accords “unilaterally.” The stark lack of cooperation from the state subsequently
prompted refusal on the part of the movement.
In Ecuador, however, concessions were more achievable, and success through existing
political structures was at least a somewhat viable option. Since CONAIE and Pachakutik
represented a coalition of Indigenous groups across the entire country, they could assert more
pressure on the existing political structure. For instance, while road blockades were employed as
a tactic in both movements, in Ecuador they were constructed across the country and fully shut it
down for significant periods, whereas in Mexico their impact was minimal. The Ecuadorian
Movement also had more widespread support from the general public, whereas in Mexico their
message appealed to mainly leftist groups. For instance, in a survey administered immediately
after CONAIE’s 1997 overthrow of Abdalá Bucaram, 71% of Ecuadorian polled said they were
in favor of the Indigenous movement (Jo-Marie 2000). The widespread nature of the movement
meant that even a closed government that excluded Indigenous people could not ignore such
pressure.
While the Ecuadorian movement was not always successful in achieving its desired
changes and policies, it was successful in gaining increased consideration from the government.
As Marc Becker states, the movement “placed Indigenous peoples and their issues at the center
of political discourse and paved the way for their entrance onto the public stage on their own
terms… it introduced a decade of greatly intensified activism during which Indigenous demands
gained a new visibility and urgency” (2012, 1). This entrance into political discourse at least
provided a possible avenue through the state where grievances could be reconciled.
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The increased Indigenous presence in the Ecuadorian political arena allowed for
successes such as winning 20.6% of the presidential vote in Pachakutik’s first election and
joining with the Patriotic Society Party to elect Lucio Gutiérrez as president. While these
developments represented significant symbolic victories for Indigenous people, they resulted in
few actual changes to the daily conditions they faced. When even the 2008 Plurinational
Constitution failed to significantly address Indigenous grievances, the movement continued to
splinter over whether political participation advanced or impeded its goals. Luis Madonado,
Indigenous activist and former minister of social welfare, for instance, argued that Pachakutik
and CONAIE have not devoted enough energy to constructing alternative systems for Indigenous
communities. Similarly, former CONAIE president Luis Macas asserted in a 2005 speech,
“Initially, we engaged in a struggle for our territory, for our traditional homelands. And we will
continue the struggle to recover our lands– the autonomous lands of each of our peoples. But we
also recognize the need to establish our own indigenous systems of thought and education” (in
Mander and Tauli-Corpuz 2006, 42). The trend towards Indigenous systems of education is
particularly pronounced in Ecuador and represents a turn away from the state and towards
community development. Since increased political participation did not result in substantive
gains for Indigenous communities as hoped, the Ecuadorian movement has likewise turned
towards refusal, although in a more splintered fashion.
If differing levels of success with more common protest methods explains the divergence
in movement tactics, what accounts for this differing success? As mentioned, political factors–
namely greater political and civil rights and a more fragmented party system in Ecuador– did
help sway Indigenous groups towards political participation. However, such participation was
only successful because the movement in Ecuador represented coordinated, widespread
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mobilization that exerted pressure from across the country, as opposed to the Zapatista
movement that occurred in one particular region.
The national nature of the Ecuadorian movement was made possible by two essential
factors. First, demographically, Ecuador maintained a greater Indigenous population. In the early
1990s, at the height of the movements, Indigenous people represented between 30 and 38% of
the population in Ecuador, while in Mexico they accounted for between 12 and 14% of the
national population (Yashar 2005, 21). This key difference meant that Indigenous political
candidates would likely earn more votes in Ecuador than in Mexico (assuming that this candidate
could capture the Indigenous vote). Furthermore, since Indigenous people in Mexico are
distributed across states such that they represent a minority in each, their voting power is
diminished (Vargas 1994). Indigenous groups in a number of provinces in the Ecuadorian
highlands represent a majority of their province and thus have more electoral sway. Differences
in demographics have therefore allowed for more electoral (and general) pressure from
Indigenous groups in Ecuador, contributing to a more coordinated effort that pursues greater
political participation.
Although resource mobilization theory was not a primary factor in explaining the
divergence in tactics (since both movements were relatively resource poor), it did play a small
role in Ecuador’s ability to build a national coalition. As Charles Tilly recognized in the 1970s,
linking to existing organizational structures can be considered a resource to aid collective action
(McAdam et al. 1996). Therefore, the second factor that allowed Ecuador to build a more
widespread Indigenous movement has to do with the organizational networks that had been
constructed over decades. In both the central highlands and the Amazon, the Catholic Church
played a key role in connecting various Indigenous tribes to form regional organizations, as
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missionaries set up schools and health centers in remote areas. Such connections between
Indigenous groups began as early as the 1940s and grew particularly strong in the 1970s.
Additionally, Indigenous linkages to class-based organizations in Ecuador proved to be a key
resource that propelled the Indigenous cause to other sects (Rice 2012). In contrast, Mexico has
not seen the same kind of consistent regional organization of Indigenous groups that would make
a national movement possible. While the Zapatistas have certainly made efforts to link their
cause to other interests, this initiative arose after the movement had already shifted towards
refusing the state, and thus was more of a means of gaining support for that tactic. Therefore,
while resource mobilization is not the main explanatory factor, Ecuador’s organizational linkages
did play a role its success via conventional protest movements.
When procedural, substantive, and eventually even structural demands failed in both
Ecuador and Mexico, groups began to give up on the state entirely. Their actions were no longer
determined by opportunities or constraints within state structures. In this manner, by turning
towards refusal or “exiting” the political system, groups simultaneously exited the political
opportunity structure. Therefore, to explain the politics of refusal, we can no longer rely on the
political opportunity structure. Rather, the politics of refusal stems from a unique position of
marginalization where groups have not only been excluded from the political system presently
and historically, but have also met significant failures when seeking particular demands. It is a
unique last resort, a political and ideological attempt to carve out a space for excluded
Indigenous identities.
Given what we learn from these cases, we can conclude that the politics of refusal may
arise under three key conditions: 1) when groups experience a lack of perceived success through
more conventional methods of collective action 2) when a group has a particular claim to

!

72!

sovereignty based on the articulation of a specific identity 3) when a movement cultivates
sufficient allies outside of the government (often internationally) that can help sustain refusal. By
delving into the construction of identity in each case and movements’ efforts to connect to
transnational support, Chapter Three will unpack the last two factors that foster the politics of
refusal.
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Chapter Three
The Instrumental and Expressive Nature of Identity
The contemporary Indigenous movements in Ecuador and Mexico have been
accompanied by a surge of Indigenous uprising across Latin America and the world and an
amplified construction of what it means to be Indigenous. However, protest by Indigenous
people is not a new phenomenon; Indigenous people in Ecuador and Mexico have been engaging
in rebellion throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods. These uprisings, however, were
largely articulated as localized struggles that operated under peasant, rather than Indigenous,
identities. Why, then, are these movements choosing to connect into and redefine Indigenous
identity? Is there something inherent that defines what it means to be Indigenous and thus
connects these groups together? What binds the Huaorani of the Ecuadorian Amazon together
with the Kichwa populations of the highlands?
If the politics of refusal helps us understand how uniquely marginalized groups find
unconventional avenues to address their grievances, examining how these groups fashion and
articulate their identities is also essential in comprehending this claim to autonomy.
Understanding how and why identity is constructed through each movement is crucial for four
reasons: first, identity highlights the elements that unite relatively disparate groups under a
political platform; secondly, Indigenous identity can be a means to articulate a unique claim to
autonomy; third, expressing the value of Indigeneity is one of the underlying goals of the
movements; lastly, the interaction between how identity is presented to and influenced by
transnational networks gives insight into the instrumental value of forming particular identities.
Before delving into these aspects of identity, it is first necessary to outline how we
conceive of this term. Theories surrounding ethnicity provide insight into the formation of
Indigenous identity. While Indigeneity is not an ethnicity per say, it plays a similar role in
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forming and mediating bonds between groups. Identity in this case is not an inherent attachment
to others as Clifford Geertz might argue (1973). Geertz conceptualizes ethnic identity as
primordial, explaining:
By a primordial attachment is meant… the given-ness that stems from being born into a
particular religious community, speaking a particular language... and following
particular practices... One is bound to one’s kinsman, one’s neighbour, one’s fellow
believer, ipso facto, as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity,
common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some
unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself (1973, 259-260).
For Geertz, ethnicity is not a malleable or a rational concept, but rather an innate attribute that
binds groups together in solidary. Primordialism contends that people will seek refuge in their
ethnic identities and maintain them even in extreme cases of discrimination and prejudice. While
there are certain elements of ethnicity that stem from ancestry, primordialism largely simplifies a
more complex situation. If groups are so rooted in their bloodlines and maintain strong
attachments to their ethnicity, this idea assumes that past ethnic conflicts will prevail indefinitely
into the future. Additionally, primordialism assumes that individuals maintain clearly
recognizable identities and thus ethnic groups are homogeneous units with specific interests and
agendas.
When applied to the notion of Indigeneity, identities are certainly not fixed or inherent,
nor are tribes at all homogeneous. Groups may have a somewhat strong attachment to their
identity as Mayans, for instance, but framing this Mayan-ness as Indigenous highlights how
identity is constantly negotiated and reinvented. If Indigenous groups place themselves under the
Indigenous umbrella, they are choosing to emphasize their similarities over their differences,
allowing their identities to intersect and even mold together.
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If Indigeneity is not primordial, the constructivist perspective provides substantial insight
into its formation. As Kanchan Chandra argues, constructivism recognizes how ethnic categories
that we take as natural are in fact the product of socio-political processes or the human attempt at
creation and interpretation. Chandra outlines three essential elements of constructivism:
individuals have multiple ethnic identities; these identities can change; and when such change
does occur, it is the product of human processes (2012). While scholars disagree on the
mechanisms for ethnic change, constructivism recognizes how external and historical processes
shape a more fluid notion of ethnic identity.
Indigeneity represents the epitome of this framework, since the distinction between
Indigenous people and settlers did not exist before colonization. As a historical process,
colonization labeled all people that originally resided in the Americas as “Indian,” highlighting
the external nature of group identification in this period. This historical distinction between
groups caused Indigenous groups to identify themselves in opposition to settlers, and thus claim
their Indigeneity to the land they occupied. As historical dynamics have shifted, Indigenous
groups’ identities in turn changed, as many began to formulate their identity in opposition to
dominant mestizo populations rather than the Spanish settlers of the past. Simultaneously, nonIndigenous people have adopted this term to perpetuate the mestizo-Indigenous separation. The
United Nations has never officially defined Indigeneity, due to the diversity of the groups
included. However, it claims that their understanding of the term is based on “self-identification;
a strong continuity with pre-colonial societies; a strong link to territories and natural resources;
distinct political, economic or political systems; distinct language, culture and beliefs; form nondominant groups of society; and resolve to maintain and produce their ancestral environments
and systems as distinctive peoples” (United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues). It
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is interesting to note that this definition requires maintaining a distinct culture and worldview in
order to remain Indigenous. In this sense, Indigeneity is both an internally and externally defined
construction.
While the constructivist perspective illustrates how Indigeneity emerged as a concept as
social processes shifted, it does not entirely delve into why the term is employed in the multiple
and broad ways it is today. An instrumentalist approach highlights the utilitarian reasons why
identifying as Indigenous may prove beneficial or detrimental depending on the context. There
are two main subsections of instrumentalism. First, as argued by Abner Cohen, instrumentalism
recognizes how individuals identify with certain ethnicities in order to receive specific benefits
from the state, such as housing, education, greater access to certain jobs, or seats reserved in the
legislature (1974). In this sense, ethnicity becomes a rational and potentially beneficial tool. The
second subsection, elite instrumentalism, contends that leaders shape ethnic identities through
deliberate mechanisms in order to achieve certain ends (Brass 1996). These ends may be
economic benefits, as Paul Collier argues, or they may be specific political outcomes (2001).
While some scholars assume instrumentalism to be self-serving, with elites seeking to
manipulate ethnic identities in order to ignite ethnic conflict, this theory can also apply to elites
that frame identity such to motivate collective action, an aspect relevant to this paper. Overall,
instrumentalism claims that ethnicity is coopted by elites as a tool to achieve their own agendas.
In the cases of Ecuador and Mexico, Indigenous identity is constructed. It emerged from
colonial processes and is perpetually reshaped (both internally and externally) based on evolving
racial consciousness and relations with the state and other sub-groups. However, in both
movements, the choice to articulate an Indigenous identity is largely an instrumental choice by
leaders. Since the boundaries of who “counts” as Indigenous remain quite broad in these
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contexts, groups can choose to frame their grievances as inextricably bound up in their
Indigenous identities, or they can distance themselves from the Indigenous label entirely. For
instance, the 2006 teachers’ strike in Oaxaca, Mexico and the creation of the Popular Assembly
of the Peoples of Oaxaca (APPO) involved a large number of Indigenous teachers, yet it did not
represent itself as part of an Indigenous movement. The Zapatista movement, in contrast,
involves some mestizo populations, relies on the support of national and international groups,
and was directed by a mestizo leader (Subcomandante Marcos). Yet its platform is conveyed as
deeply Indigenous. Given this key difference, why would the Zapatista and Ecuadorian
movements express their platform as Indigenous? What values does this representation hold?
This chapter will delve into the articulation of identity by the movements to prompt both
domestic pressure and transnational support. I will begin by examining the tools that each
movement has used to unite their diverse Indigenous communities. This challenge is especially
pronounced in Ecuador, where coastal tribes and highland communities arguably differ more
than Mayan villages in Chiapas. These “uniting factors” will highlight how, particularly in
Ecuador, a broader Indigenous identity has been constructed as the key connective tissue
between groups. The last two sections will delve into the instrumental and expressive uses of
Indigeneity, analyzing the choice to build each movement under this identity. I will argue that
invoking Indigeneity was a strategic way of claiming the right to autonomy and even
legitimizing the politics of refusal, but it was also a way to express the power behind this identity
itself. Lastly, I will consider how the movements’ identities have been cultivated in order to gain
transnational support, especially in Mexico, and how outside actors have in turn influenced this
identity. Overall, the chapter will seek to illuminate how identity has been constructed and
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articulated instrumentally and expressively and how this formation ties into the politics of refusal
and transnational support.

Identity Construction and Uniting a Movement:
When examining the use of an Indigenous identity, there is a common assumption among
scholars that all Indigenous groups share at least some core values that are inherent and unite
across geographical distance, such as a reverence for the natural world. Even Alison Brysk
maintains, “Most (Indigenous groups) have a sacred relationship with nature, strong kinship
structures including past generations, an emphasis on reciprocity within the community, a
nonlinear sense of time, diffuse authority relationships, and a high value for harmony and
balance” (2000, 56-57). Brysk goes on to note how these core characteristics have informed
Indigenous movements, as environmentalism sparks alliances with environmental groups and
kinship ties facilitate pan-Indigenous relations.
The way in which Brysk relies on inherent cultural factors to explain movement
development is overly simplified for two reasons. First, it homogenizes vastly diverse cultures
that do not necessarily share these traits. Even if a culture does emphasize a spiritual relationship
with the earth, we cannot assume that this trait will automatically align with the interests of
environmental groups, and therefore use it to explain the evolution of a particular movement.
The Huaorani of the Ecuadorian Amazon, for instance, have constantly had to navigate their
relationship with environmental groups, especially when they decided it was in their best interest
to sign contracts with oil companies. As the organization Acción Ecológica emphasizes, many
environmental groups see Indigenous people as a “natural environmentalist, a spiritual protector
of the forest– really an updated version of the 'noble savage’” (quoted in Ziegler-Otero 2004,
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18). The assumption that Indigenous groups always seek to prioritize environmental concerns
can create false expectations that goals will always align.
Secondly, Brysk’s claim forms the false notion that Indigenous groups are fixed in time
and thus will continue to maintain these traits, if they are indeed a piece of their culture.
Indigenous cultures, like any, are not static or perpetually rooted in particular values; rather they
adapt and shift in their respective contexts. While it is convenient to rely on the idea that all
Indigenous groups maintain some similar traits and use these traits to explain unity in a
movement, these groups are actually quite heterogeneous. Even certain Mayan villages in
Chiapas, for instance, are known to be long-standing adversaries, despite their shared language
and overlapping cultures (personal communication 2016). Thus, just as we cannot rely on
Geertz’s primordialism to explain collective identity formation in these movements, we cannot
hinge on these assumed inherent elements of Indigeneity.
If intrinsic aspects of Indigeneity may or may not exist, but are not a reliable basis for
explaining the collective identity formation of a movement, what unites these various
communities? I argue that it is in fact Indigenous identity that forms the connective tissue
between groups, but that it is a particular construction by movement leaders of what Indigeneity
means. This formed identity may be bound up with a peasant identity, a marginalized status, and
even some shared values, but it is an active construction rather than a given. In her analysis of
identity-based resistance in Ecuador, Amalia Pallares explores how identity is constantly
reshaped. She asserts, “In contrast to previous analyses that see indigenous struggle as either a
class or an ethnic struggle… my thesis is that class, race, and ethnicity are remade by the
activists in the process of a political struggle” (2002, 34). This distinction is useful in that it
highlights how seemingly distinct identities can actually interweave to create a new politicized
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identity. The Indigenous identities in both cases draw on a shared history, parallel experiences of
marginalization, a racialization that ranked Indigenous groups at the bottom of a complex social
hierarchy, and ideas surrounding shared values to remake Indigenous identity. This refashioned
identity serves to both unite groups, make specific claims to the state, and gain transnational
support, as I will explore in subsequent sections.
If identity is reconstructed in a political fashion, what does this process look like in each
case study? As noted, Indigenous identity constitutes the base of how each movement identifies,
but the term itself is fairly ambiguous. In the document “Proyecto Político de la CONAIE,”
CONAIE defines Indigenous communities as cohesive collectives that “are original inhabitants
of their region and have been placed inside the institutionalization of another dominant society…
They define themselves in relation to a society that isn’t original” (1994, my translation). In this
sense, Indigenous identity relies on a unique claim to land (based on being original inhabitants).
Even more crucial, however, is the way in which Indigenous identity relies on highlighting its
contradistinction from dominant society.
The following chart showcases how particular constructions of Indigenous identity have
been articulated throughout the movements. The Zapatista movement has issued six declarations
written by the EZLN that outline the movement’s demands, progress and identity. While less
linear, CONAIE has also written documents asserting similar movement characteristics, and the
documents below represent a sampling of these. The quotes below represent each instance where
the given document has explicitly defined the movement as something. These quotes do not
incorporate references to movement demands or grievances, but rather solely focus on how the
movements seek to define themselves.
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A Classification of Articulated Identities6:
Document

Peasant/
Marginalized Unique
Agricultural Status
Conception
of the
World

Claim to
Land

Lack of
Resources,
Simplicity

“Inheritors of
the true builders
of our nation.”

“Poor men just
like us.”

General
Public/
Sameness

Mexico:
First
Declaration
of the
Lacandon
Jungle
(December
1993)
Second
Declaration
of the
Lacandon
Jungle (June
1994)
Third
Declaration
of the
Lacandon
Jungle
(December
1994)

“Product of 500
years of struggle. “
“The
dispossessed.”

“Voices!from!
the!land!we!
hear!our!pain!
and!our!
history.”

“We are
Mexicans.”
- “We are all
under siege.”

“Recognize!the!
characteristics!
of!Indigenous!
people’s!own!
social,!political!
and!cultural!
organization.”!
!
“Recognition!of!
the!
particularities!
of!the!
indigenous!
groups.”!!

“ The country
again forgot the
original
inhabitants of
these lands.”

“Our struggle is
national.”

“We are here, we
are rebel dignity,
the forgotten of
the homeland.”

“Men and
women who
reject
conformity.”

“We were born of
the night.”

“The indigenous
Mexicans, the
ones always
forced to listen,
to obey, to
accept, to resign
themselves, took
the word and
spoke the

“The
government
discovered its
ignorance in
regards to the
original
inhabitants of
these lands.”

“Face the anger
of the
campesinos
(peasants).”

“The same
intimidation and
repression that our
people have
suffered for the
last 65 years.”

“The!most!
dispossessed!
sectors!in!the!
country,!the!
workers!and!the!
peasants.”

“Subjected to a
great campaign of
defamation and
indiscriminate
repression.”
“EZLN watched,
powerlessly, as the
best sons and
daughters of the
dignity of Chiapas
were assassinated,
jailed and
threatened.”
“Most humble and
forgotten
minorities of
contemporary
Mexico.”

Fourth
Declaration
of the
Lacandon
Jungle
(January
1996)

“All those
communities, all
those who work
the land, all
whom we invite
to stand on our
side” (Emiliano
Zapata quote read
at start).

“For us pain and
anguish, for us the
joy of rebellion,
for us a future
denied, for us the
dignity of

“The!earth!
does!not!rest;!it!
walks!in!our!
hearts.”

“A people armed
with wooden
guns and
the word of
dignity.”

“Brothers and
sisters of other
races and
languages,
of other colors,
but with the
same heart.”
“The Zapatista
war is only a
part of that
great war which
is the struggle
between a

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6!EZLN!documents!accessed!in!English;!CONAIE!documents!are!my!translation.!!
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insurrection. For
us nothing.”

history which
aspires for a
future and an
amnesia which
has foreign
vocation.”

wisdom which is
in their walk.”

“They do not want
Indians. They
want us dead.”

Fifth
Declaration
of the
Lacandon
Jungle
(July1998)

“The indigenous
heart which is the
dignified root of
the Mexican
nation.”

Sixth
Declaration
of the
Lacandon
Jungle (July
2005)

“Our way to do
what we say.”
“Now we are
going to explain
to you how we,
the Zapatistas,
see what is going
on in the world.
We see that
capitalism is the
strongest right
now.”

“The words of
the first
inhabitants of
these lands now
hold a special
place in public
opinion.”
“We are going
to seek, and to
find, those who
love these lands
and these skies
even as much as
we do.”

“Zapatistas do
not respond with
violence.”

“Touch the
hearts of humble
and simple
people like
ourselves.”
“And this was
our simple word
sent out to the
noble hearts of
those simple and
humble people
who resist and
rebel against
injustices all
over the world.”

“Our heart was
not the same as
before, when we
began our
struggle. It was
larger, because
now we had
touched the
hearts of many
good people.”
“It is only from
the left that a
plan of struggle
can emerge, so
that our Patria,
which is
Mexico, does
not die.”

Ecuador:
Political
Project of
CONAIE
(1994)
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“We have
survived
exploitation,
genocide,
ethnocide and
dehumanizing
suppression from
western
civilization.”

“We practice a
communal way
of life, since the
appearance of
our agrariancolectivist
society.”

“We practice an
integrated
humanism when
man and nature,
in harmonious
interrelation,
guarantee life.”

“We are
indigenous
communities that
have the same
origin, a common
history, our own
languages; and
that we are
governed by our
own laws,
customs, beliefs
and forms of
social, economic
and political
organization in
our territories.”
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Political
Project of the
Constitution
of a
Plurinational
Ecuador
(1998)

Agrarian
Agenda of
the Land
Organizations
of Ecuador
(2003)

“The
communities of
Ecuador are
conscious that
building national
unity between
the diverse
cultures,
languages and
nationalities that
make up the rich
human base of
the republic is a
vital project.”
“Agricultural
peasants are
against the
terrible public
politicians, and
continue being
the sustainers of
nutrition for our
country.”

“We have done
these things
despite facing
increasingly more
exclusion, since
we live, as
peasants and
indigenous
communities, in
the mark of a
deepening
neoliberal
system.”
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This chart highlights how Indigenous identity is based not just on a particular worldview,
but rather is a complex web of characteristics that differentiate these groups from dominant
society. This unique claim to self-determination may at times be based on marginalization, but it
might also hinge on being the original inhabitants of an area. Both movements share this
interweaving of identities that differentiate Indigenous people from dominant society. However,
when it comes to expressing similarities with popular society and crafting their struggle as more
universal, these cases diverge. While simultaneously differentiating themselves from dominant
society, The Zapatista movement has made an explicit attempt to construct their struggle as
universal and thus attract the attention of leftist and social justice groups. Although the
Ecuadorian movement has also sought international support, these efforts have been more
focused on tying into the pan-Indigenous movement, rather that appealing to other causes.
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Through its simultaneous universalizing and differentiation of the Indigenous cause, the
Zapatista case has sought to both legitimize its claims and gain international support.
If these communities deliberately use an Indigenous identity to unite various groups, gain
autonomy from the state, and reap transnational support, how does this identity construction
differ from the framing processes of social movement theory? If we revisit the ideas put forth by
Snow et al., framing is a conscious and strategic effort by leaders to present grievances in a
particular fashion intended to legitimate and motivate collective action (1986). Framing is thus a
deliberate process, usually for policy gains, aimed at a specific named target (such as the state).
There are certainly aspects of identity construction in these cases that fall in this realm. For
instance, these movements have framed themselves as groups with a particular claim to
sovereignty in order to gain policies that grant such autonomy from the state. However, before
framing is even involved, there is a separate identity project at the root of these movements: the
reclamation and redefinition of Indigenous identity. This is not a strategic aspect of the
movement that seeks particular policy changes, but rather intends to express the value of
Indigeneity and thus question exclusionary cultural norms. This assertion of Indigenous power
holds expressive value for those involved in the movement, and thus is an aspect of collective
action that transcends strategic framing processes.
The deliberate expression of Indigenous identity holds potential value both for strategic
and expressive purposes. In her article on gay rights in Vermont, Mary Bernstein begins to
explore how a collective identity is necessary for any social movement. She notes how scholars
tend to conceive of identity-based movements as either expressive, by challenging dominant
norms and seeking cultural transformation, or as instrumental. Instrumental movements aim
towards achieving specific goals, rather than seeking the recognition of new identities. However,
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Bernstein argues that identity can be both deployed as a political strategy (instrumental) and be
the goal of the movement (expressive) simultaneously. Groups may aim not just for specific
changes, but to assert their identity and rights simultaneously. Asserting identity may seek to
transform political and cultural norms in society (2002, 86).
The Zapatista and Ecuadorian cases mark concrete examples of both expressive and
instrumental identity-based movements. Although not explicitly outlined in the above chart, each
document refers to the Indigeneity behind the movement numerous times as a way to assert and
reclaim what it means to be Indigenous. As the “Third Declaration of the Lacandón Jungle”
asserts, “With the offensive in December 1994, the EZLN sought to show, to Mexico and to the
world, its proud indigenous essence” (EZLN 1994). This is just one of many instances where
Indigeneity is articulated as an honorable, strong force that will no longer tolerate oppression.
The Zapatista case is particularly noteworthy for frequently describing its Indigenous identity as
exemplifying dignity. The equation of dignity with Indigeneity underscores how the Zapatista
movement seeks to reconstruct political and cultural norms that have generally conceived of
Indigeneity as negative.
When expressive and instrumental values of identity are embedded together, groups must
balance their pursuit of concrete goals with identity displays. In an overview of identity and
social movements, Bernstein and Taylor note how identity can be constructed as essentialist, an
element that has sparked debate in the gay rights movement. An essentialized identity is a fairly
narrow construction of what is needed to fit into a particular group, where certain characteristics
are vital to being considered part of the identity. As the above chart illustrates, both cases invoke
somewhat of an essentialist identity in order to differentiate themselves from dominant society.
As Bernstein and Taylor recognize, these essentialized identities stem from political contexts in
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which the dominant society devalues this identity (2013). In response, groups construct an
essentialist identity to assert who they are and their value in society. Essentialism thus carries an
expressive benefit.
Constructing an essentialist identity can also be strategic. Nancy Naples (2003) helps
clarify this point through the feminist perspective. As Bernstein and Taylor summarize her
argument, “Self-definition and the creation of knowledge through the development of a
standpoint is a form of political activism and does not rely on false universal understandings of
categories such as race, gender, sexuality or class. Thus organizing around an identity
represented as essential can be strategic” (2013, 2). In our cases, as Naples asserts, identity
becomes more about political activism than false reliance on universal concepts of what
Indigeneity entails. Relatively essentialist identities, therefore, are constructed for political gains,
not to create a false notion that all Indigenous groups share inherent characteristics.
Essentialism, as noted, helped differentiate Indigenous groups from dominant society.
However, neither Indigenous movement pursued a solely essentialist identity. Rather, both
fluctuated between essentializing and universalizing their struggles for entirely different ends. As
the next two sections will explore, constructing relatively essentialist identities in both cases and
differentiating themselves from dominant society helped these movements legitimize their
grievances and strategies. Specifically, essentialized identity construction legitimized groups’
claims to land, specialized education, and ultimately autonomy and the politics of refusal.
However, both groups sought to align with international movements to augment their causes.
This created a tension for both movements, since such alliances necessitated constructing a more
universalized version of their struggle rather than relying on a strict identity. Because the
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Zapatista movement pursued transnational support more extensively than CONAIE, it had to
navigate the tension between essentialist and universal identities to a greater degree.

The Instrumental Value of Essentialized Identity:
Upon reflection, it becomes quite clear that both the Zapatista and Ecuadorian Indigenous
movements are expressive identity movements. Given the negative associations of Indigeneity
historically, translated into exclusionary policies as previously noted, it seems natural for groups
to want to reclaim and redefine this identity. This reclamation project has served to unite quite
heterogeneous groups. What remains slightly less apparent and more crucial to explore is the
strategic value of identity construction. An essentialized Indigenous identity differentiated from
dominant culture puts weight behind Indigenous calls for autonomy, since a right to sovereignty
can only really be claimed by a group perceived as unique and separate. It is crucial to note that
these constructed identities in both cases were not always essentialist. The Ecuadorian movement
expanded the identity of their cause through alliances with class movements, while the Zapatistas
magnified their identity to an ideology by appealing to international anti-capitalist groups.
Because Indigeneity is so amorphous in nature, essentialism in these cases refers to the ways in
which these groups articulate Indigeneity as distinct from the majority of the population. Thus, it
does not apply to the Zapatista attempts to appeal to Mexican civil society nor building alliances
with other populist political parties in Ecuador.
When it comes to differentiating an identity from dominant culture, social movement
scholars focus on the balance between essentializing for movement cohesion versus suppressing
differences to build alliances. As Sidney Tarrrow explains in regards to the 1993 lesbian and gay
march on Washington, “(the organizers) face a dilemma: how to put forth a set of unsettling
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demands for unconventional people in ways that will not make enemies of potential allies. They
do so by playing down their differences before the media and the country while celebrating it in
private” (1994, 10). In our cases, however, the movements reclaim and assert their difference not
just in private, but also in the public realm.
Bernstein unpacks this debate further by examining the factors that lead a movement to
either celebrate or suppress differences. She argues that variations in political access,
oppositional forces, and relationships among organizations under the specific identity lead to
“deploying identity” in either an inclusive or exclusive manner. Black nationalism during the
Civil Rights Movement, for instance, was not just a way of strategically deploying an essentialist
identity, but it did so in a way that was critical of dominant society. Bernstein writes:
By fostering an identity based on differences from the majority, black nationalism was a
way to challenge dominant cultural values, to build communities, and to create
revolutionary change. Leaders hoped that deploying critical identities based on perceived
cultural differences would be a crucial step toward economic independence and political
power (1997, 557).
In this sense, a critical identity (a strategic, essentialist identity) legitimized the Black right to
revitalize their communities and pursue a more revolutionary cause.
Political access, oppositional forces to the movement, and interactions among
organizations within a movement indeed help shape the essentialization of identities in these
cases. Since the forces against both movements were significant (both in terms of a lack of
political compromise and military opposition), it seems natural that groups would assert a strict
identity as a means to push back against this opposition. However, these aspects outlined by
Bernstein are more what I would call “input factors,” that is the institutional factors that mold
how a movement constructs identity. More relevant for these cases are what I deem “output
factors,” or the potential outcomes that a movement might expect from constructing an
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essentialized identity. Output factors in these cases consist of the ability to claim land,
specialized education, self-government or even refuse existing systems, based on essentialized
Indigeneity.
Due to the unique nature of Indigenous identity, where being the first inhabitants alone
creates difference from the majority, these groups have the potential to reclaim their rights by
reclaiming their difference. The push for autonomy therefore stems from a narrow construction
of Indigenous identity. In other words, an Indigenous identity legitimizes the claim for land,
multicultural education, communal forms of living, self-government, and refusal, at least from
the movement’s point of view.
How do these groups utilize an Indigenous identity to push for autonomy over their
affairs? In Ecuador, intercultural bilingual education, land rights, communal self-government,
and cultural strength remain at the forefront of the movement, as stated in its original demands
(conaie.org). In its 1994 document on their political project, CONAIE asserts:
The cultural identity of many people and nationalities has disappeared, and they have
instead suffered serious influences and impositions from western cultural values, that
debilitate and threaten our cultural and spiritual richness. Political and cultural
colonialism… negates the potentiality and diversity of existing cultures in Ecuador (1994,
41, my translation).
In this statement, CONAIE articulates Indigenous identity as threatened by the infiltration of
western values, a common sentiment among many Indigenous leaders. If western ideals overrun
a particular culture, reasserting the right for cultural spaces requires naming the identity specific
enough to merit its own space. The document goes on to claim, “Cultural imposition is another
obstacle to the development of our cultural identity, and therefore we should fight firmly and
with dedication until its destruction” (1994, 41, my translation). The document then outlines
several ways to fight this cultural imposition by strengthening spaces for Indigenous culture,
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including through Indigenous-specific education and healthcare. Even at its inception, CONAIE
was leveraging an identity that differentiated Indigeneity from the majority to push for its own
autonomous systems.
In the Zapatista movement, leaders drew on an Indigenous identity as the basis to push
for similar rights. Carving out a space for Indigenous cultures and languages in education was a
vital aspect of this goal. The San Andrés Accords, for instance, declared that all Indigenous
education must be bilingual and bicultural (Shenker 2012). Without the weight of a specific
identity behind this claim, bicultural education would not be a consideration. When the accords
were rejected, however, the Zapatistas still implemented multicultural education in their
communities. Autonomous schools served as a key way to nourish and reclaim this identity. As
anthropologist Sarah Dee Shenker recognizes:
The Zapatistas’ desire to ‘build from below for alternatives to neoliberal destruction’ has
been partially fulfilled by the autonomous schools, which by working to meet their
objectives have challenged the ‘homogenizing national project’ and constructed an
alternative educational model: a new space in which indigenous identity can breathe and
thrive” (2012, 441).
Constructing these spaces where “indigenous identity can breathe and thrive” requires
differentiating this identity from dominant culture.
Multicultural education in both Ecuador and Mexico continues to be a key realm where
leaders articulate difference. Luis Macas, former president of CONAIE, notes, “We take for
granted that a differentiation between the two cultures (Indigenous and western) is fundamental;
though they share a common ancestry, they are distinct in their respective cosmovisions. Plain
and simple, we are different in our conceptions, principles, sciences, knowledge, and our
processes for constructing knowledge and identity” (in Meyer and Alvarado 2010, 239). Noam
Chomsky also makes the claim that, based on specific identities that differ from the dominant
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culture, Indigenous students do not thrive in western educational systems. In a 2004 interview
regarding Indigenous education in general, Chomsky argues:
The official and conventional education system, the communication media, schooling–
these are all enemies of indigenous communities because, in the end, the individual
whose being is intrinsically communal, whose behavior and life style are collective, is
culturally alienated, individualized, confused, and adopts strange behaviors and even
behaviors antagonistic to the community. Therefore, education should be communitarian,
a responsibility of the community, within the community, and for the community” (in
Meyer and Alvarado 2010, 241).
In this passage, Chomsky uses the notion of Indigenous identity as inherently communal to
legitimize his call for autonomous education. In this sense, the essentialized identity that limits
Indigeneity to those with a communal cosmology and way of life holds strategic value.
Ultimately, the same essentialized identity that legitimizes these claims to autonomy
validates the politics of refusal, not necessarily for the state, but for the communities involved in
the movement. Even when the state does not recognize the distinctiveness of Indigenous identity
as a viable reason for a community to create its own systems, this identity construction gives
validity to this claim within the movement. If identity is constructed to be distinct from dominant
culture and specialized systems and rights deemed necessary, creating these systems becomes
more important than gaining support from the state. In other words, if the state is not willing to
support the unique systems that a specific identity needs, the groups will create those systems
themselves. Because an essentialized identity helps legitimize groups’ claims to autonomy for
the state and refusal for communities involved, this identity construction is both externally and
internally strategic.
A bit more insight into Zapatista schools helps highlight how movement leaders use the
uniqueness of Indigenous identity to gain support for refusal as a tactic. First, Zapatista
leadership voiced the sentiment that government schools were inadequate spaces for Indigenous
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identities. In regards to his schooling experience, Arnulo, a Zapatista elected representative of
Pico Aglando, stated:
I studied at the government primary and secondary schools. The teachers weren’t
enthusiastic; they came from far away and often didn’t arrive to class. Sometimes, they
even arrived drunk, and they were violent… They only taught us to read and write, and
always in Spanish – pure Spanish! I didn’t enjoy it – it gave me a headache (quoted in
Shenker 2012, 435).
Arnulo’s reference to the prioritization of Spanish over Indigenous languages represents one way
of claiming that Indigenous people need schools that recognize their unique identities and
incorporate their cultures into the classroom. Sarah Dee Shenker, an anthropologist focused on
Zapatista schools in Riocolán and Pico Aglando found that the main goals of the autonomous
schools were the protection of Indigenous values, culture, and language; gender equality; and
gearing education to the rural context (2012). Both Zapatista leaders and community members
use the claim that state-run schools do not substantially recognize their cultures, languages, or
identities, to augment their grounds for creating their own educational system. The construction
of this essentialized, distinct identity therefore puts weight behind the politics of refusal.

Gaining Transnational Support Through a Universalized Struggle:
An essentialized identity is not the only form of identity the Zapatista and Ecuadorian
Indigenous movements articulate. Because of the severe marginalization and lack of political
power Indigenous people have faced, these groups have leveraged alliances to have their
demands heard, whether those alliances are other Indigenous movements, NGOs, international
groups, or even the United Nations. Indigenous movements, therefore, face a unique and difficult
dilemma: on the one hand, their claims to autonomy necessitate defining an essentialized
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identity, while on the other, attracting crucial alliances requires highlighting relatable
characteristics of the movements.
This dilemma is not unlike the “queer dilemma” put forth by Joshua Gamson (1995) and
Judith Lorber (1999), where a movement seeks to deconstruct categories of race, class or
ethnicity, but to do so they must articulate their identity and thus rely on those same categories.
As Lorber writes, “We want to erase the boundaries between categories of race, gender and
sexuality, but to do so, we have to use them, for without categories, you can have neither a
politics of identity nor a politics of transgression. Categories are needed for group power and
boundaries are needed to transgress against” (quoted in Bernstein and De la Cruz 2009, 729).
Neither Indigenous movement in our case seeks to erase racial boundaries entirely; rather they
seek to redefine what it means to occupy a particular ethnicity and pressure the state to recognize
their identities in a profound fashion. In this sense, the movements do not fully face the “queer
dilemma.” They do, however, require boundaries for group power and a more inclusive discourse
to gain transnational support.
This tricky balancing act is quite evident in the discourse employed by each movement,
particularly by the Zapatistas. Ultimately, by restricting movement identity to explicitly
Indigenous but broadening their overall struggle to be more universal, the Zapatistas seek to
navigate this dilemma. Attempts to make their struggle more appealing to transnational groups
remain prevalent throughout the movement. In each of the six declarations (which are geared
towards the international community), the EZLN calls for a “radical” transformation of the state
of Mexico, but they never refer to themselves as “radicals.” Rather, they refer to themselves as
“rebels” or to their “rebel cause,” usually pairing this description with the words “dignity.”
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Straying away from self-defining as radical demonstrates how the Zapatistas seek to define their
movement as part of the universal struggle for justice.
The depiction of a just cause highlights the attempt to appeal to a wide array of outside
groups for potential support. For instance, in the Fourth Declaration, the EZLN writes, “Brothers
and sisters of other races and languages, of other colors, but with the same heart now protect our
light, and in it they drink of the same fire. When the homeland speaks its Indian heart, it will
have dignity and memory” (EZLN 1996). The reference to those “with the same heart” seeks to
appeal to human rights groups and other individuals who might sympathize with these
Indigenous groups. This metaphorical rhetoric seeks to construct unity between groups across
Mexico and the world.
The last column in the “Classifying Identity” chart above highlights instances in which
the EZLN had tried to emphasize their similarities to the general public over their differences.
These similarities range from emphasizing cohesion as Mexicans, as in the statement “We are all
Mexicans,” to appealing to other leftist movements (EZLN 1994). For instance, the EZLN
proclaims, “The Zapatista war is only a part of that great war which is the struggle between a
history which aspires for a future and an amnesia which has foreign vocation” (EZLN 1996).
Here, the EZLN emphasizes the notion that the ideology behind the movement is pervasive in
struggles across the globe. The dichotomy between amnesia and those who aspire for a future
once again casts the Zapatista as on the side of justice, which seeks to appeal to human rights and
humanist groups. The ELZN often refers to their supporters as “the good people” or “people with
similar hearts,” which stands in stark contrast to their constant description of “the bad
government.” These quotes emphasizing similarity with certain groups highlight the malleable
nature of identity and its role in gaining transnational support.
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There is no doubt that through diverse ways of framing their movement, the Zapatistas
were able to galvanize a wide array of transnational groups, although it remains unclear whether
these linkages have actually pushed the movement towards meeting its goals. The 1994
occupation of San Cristobal de las Casas, a tourist destination, certainly attracted international
attention in a way that less disruptive movements did not receive. In the two weeks following
their initial occupation, there were 337 stories written on the Zapatistas in major Englishspeaking international newspapers, expanding to 743 stories after ten weeks (Bob 2005).
Drawing on the attention gained in their original armed phase, the Zapatistas’ subsequent shift to
non-violent tactics allowed them to differentiate themselves from other Latin American guerilla
movements to the international community.
The Zapatistas’ large body of written documents has certainly contributed to its ability to
appeal to outside networks. These written works can largely be attributed to Subcomandante
Marcos, who produced a large output of documents, manifestos, and even fables regarding the
Zapatista agenda. The ability to tap into the Internet as a resource has significantly boosted the
movement’s support. A list serve established as early as 1993 provided a space for academics
and activists to circulate Zapatista materials, and the ¡Ya Basta! website produced in 1994 by a
Swarthmore College employee provided “a mouthpiece for the Zapatistas in cyberspace” (Bob
2005, 132). By 2003, the ¡Ya Basta! website had already reached four million visits. Personal
contacts supplemented their Internet circulation. In mid 1994, the Zapatistas spread to the U.S.
through the creation of the National Committee for Democracy in Mexico, based in El-Paso,
Texas. The group lobbied U.S. legislators to pass resolutions in support of the Zapatista struggle,
pushed to keep media attention on Chiapas, and published Libertad, a monthly newspaper on the
Zapatistas (Bob 2005). Such efforts to spread their message overseas demonstrate how
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invaluable even symbolic gestures (such as a supportive resolution) from international actors
could be for the Zapatistas.
As political scholar Clifford Bob acknowledges, the Zapatistas’ effective diffusion of
their message has largely “hinged on the groups’ respective standing, accessibility, and public
relations skills” (2005, 134). Skills regarding media relations, use of the Internet, writing and
translating documents, and deliberate movement tactics have certainly played a role in
distributing messages. However, merely circulating a message does not necessarily trigger the
financial or symbolic support that the Zapatistas seek. Movement leaders thus began to target the
amorphous mass of “civil society” with messaging intended to draw leftist populations into the
effort to form a more inclusive Mexico. Conventions such as the “International Meeting for
Humanity against Neoliberalism” or the “Encounters between the Zapatistas and the People of
the World” marked significant attempts to mobilize this collection of possible supporters. The
Zapatistas have even distributed polls domestically and internationally on key issues. In June
1995, for instance, the Alianza Cívica circulated a poll asking whether the Zapatistas should
form their own political wing. One million three hundred thousand people from across Mexico
and another 55,000 from abroad participated in the poll, highlighting the Zapatistas’ growing
visibility (Bob 2005).
Through these alliance-building efforts, the Zapatistas have constructed a broad set of
linkages. Human rights organizations remain at the center of this network, as international
groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International issue reports on abuses from the
Mexican government and paramilitary groups and keep Chiapas under the media spotlight. A
number of social justice NGOs compliment the work of human rights groups, drawn to the
region by the poverty that the movement shed light on. These organizations run programs
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directly in Chiapas, which range from funded local NGOs to aid shipments, for both Zapatista
and non-Zapatista Indigenous communities. Solidarity organizations make up the third strand of
the network. These organizations, which are directly sympathetic to the Zapatista cause, issue
reports, send aid shipments, assist in local disputes, lobby their home-country governments for
supportive resolutions, host Zapatista leaders on international visits, and issue statements of
solidarity. The main locally based solidarity organization is Enlace Civil, located in San
Cristobal de las Casas. Enlace Civil coordinates between Zapatista communities and serves to
link Zapatistas with allied international groups, continually expanding their network (Bob 2005).
This web of sympathetic organizations primarily serves to draw more attention to the Chiapas
conflict and to financially support the creation of autonomous communities.
Overall, the Zapatistas have sought to attract transnational support by shifting their
grievances from everything from domestic marginalization to lack of political inclusion to
foreign domination through neoliberal reforms. These expansive goals and grievances construct
their struggle as more expansive than a group of Indigenous peasants rebelling in southern
Mexico. When aimed at transnational (especially leftist) audiences, the identity behind the
movement expands to an overarching ideology. Their Indigenous identity may be more essential,
but what they intend to stand for is more universal.
For the Zapatista movement, an Indigenous identity combined with a universalized
struggle helped garner transnational support. An Indigenous identity, for instance, has not only
allowed (even the mestizo) leaders to link to the pan-Indigenous movement, but it has also
attracted non-Indigenous supporters sympathetic to the long-excluded group. Latter-day U.S.
politician Tom Hayden, for instance, wrote about how his trip to Chiapas represented “a personal
Holy Grail,” where he was able to reclaim his “collective indigenous roots, mangled beneath the
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architecture of our modern selves… I felt slightly like another in the long line of gringos seeking
rebirth in Mexico” (2009, 78, 83). Indeed, “zapa-tourism” has been an emerging source of
visibility and revenue for the movement, attracting activists, scholars, and leftist travelers to
Chiapas. The Indigenous identity of the movement has created somewhat mystical, romanticized
images for many people that cultivate further intrigue. Many Indigenous groups in North and
South America have issued statements of solidarity with the Zapatistas, although some have
critiqued their socialist origins and mestizo leadership (Bob 2005). Support from both
Indigenous and non-Indigenous groups worldwide showcases how the Zapatistas have crafted
their image to appeal to a wide range of networks. Ultimately, constructing an essentialized
Indigenous identity fighting a universalized struggle has made this support possible.
Since the pan-Indigenous movement in Ecuador has held transnational linkage as much
less of a tactic, their identity construction has not been quite so universalized. Rather than
appealing to a wide array of transnational networks, the Ecuadorian movement has largely
sought to tap into the pan-Indigenous movement from North to South America. In the “Who We
Are” section of their website, CONAIE even describes one of their ten goals as “Maintain
international relation with Indigenous nationalities of the ABYA-YALA continent, in order to
create viable alternative communication among Indigenous peoples and with other social sectors
committed to the cause” (CONAIE 2015, my translation). Abya-Yala is a Kuna (a Panamanian
Indigenous group) term for the American continent, stretching from the North American arctic to
Patagonia. Its use among Indigenous groups across the continent represents an attempt to
cultivate a sense of unity between tribes and reclaim the American continent as Indigenous.
Because connecting into this Abya-Yala Indigenous network is the Ecuadorian movement’s
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principle focus transnationally, it does not have to universalize its struggle like the Zapatistas.
Rather, an essentialized Indigenous identity can augment this support.
While navigating identities for an international audience is not a key aspect of the
Ecuadorian movement, balancing identities domestically certainly is. As Ecuadorian scholar
Amalia Pallares notes, in its shift from largely class-based platforms to an Indigenous identity,
activists have had to maintain a relatively flexible program in order to bring together
heterogeneous groups across the nation. A national Indigenous identity did not exist previously,
as many Indigenous communities in the highlands felt little affinity for Amazonian groups, and
visa versa (Yashar 2005). As Pallares recognizes, “It is precisely because indianismo is so porous
that it can be many things to many different people and can mobilize local movements as
disparate as the ones in Cacha and Cotacachi” (2002, 219). In this manner, Indigeneity itself has
brought groups together, precisely because it can be interpreted in so many ways.
The ability to forge an Indigenous national identity hinged on tapping into existing
networks that helped cultivate shared identity within communities or regions. Churches, unions
and NGOs often laid the groundwork for Indigenous organization later on, both by forming
organizational structures and reorienting ethnic consciousness. When CONAIE organized to
connect regional Indigenous networks that were already forming, it did so with the intent of
preserving these local Indigenous systems rather than completely taking over. The 1988
“Preliminary Draft of the Law of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador,” proposed that CONAIE
would direct national dialogues, but local leaders and assemblies would still be the site where
communities would decide their actions in the movement (Yashar 2005). The goal was thus to
connect local struggles that held similar grievances and transport their voices to the national
level. This initial idea was crucial to the ability to bring tribes across the country together
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through CONAIE, as it prioritized the local struggles of communities through diffuse
organization. In practice, however, CONAIE’s capacity to maintain local strength was limited,
which partially contributed to its decline in support in the early 2000s.
Along with bringing together groups on an Indigenous basis, CONAIE also had to
balance class interests with ethnic demands in its construction of this national movement. By
constructing Indigenous identity as inherently tied to class grievances, the group was able to
maintain previous overlap between class and regional Indigenous struggles. The call for agrarian
reform, for instance, hinged on both class and ethnic rationales. CONFENAIE, the regional
organization for Indigenous Amazonia, articulated how land is key to ethnic survival, as natural
surroundings form the basis of ethnic identity, cosmology, and way of life for many groups.
ECUARUNARI in the highlands, however, tended to operate with a more class-based conception
of land, where territory was a productive resource. In the formation of CONAIE and the merging
of these distinct perspectives, the new organization had to blend class and ethnic grievances in
order to craft its own rationale for land reform (Yashar 2005). As Amalia Pallares recognizes in
regards to this shift, “In this new perspective, there was a cultural dimension to all material needs
and demands, and cultural issues/policies could not be kept separately from the material needs of
the population” (1997, 349). The blending of ethnic and class demands under the amorphous
umbrella of Indigeneity reflects CONAIE’s attempts to navigate a heterogeneous array of
interests and identities.
In both cases, identity proves to be both an essential tool and a difficult category to
navigate. An Indigenous identity in both the Zapatista and Ecuadorian movements has served to
unite heterogeneous communities under a reconstructed racial conscience. An essentialized
version of this identity helped these groups make claims for autonomy, including specialized
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systems of education, government, cultural spaces, and land rights. This particular identity,
framed as deserving autonomy, has even been used to rationalize the politics of refusal to the
communities involved. However, defining a movement around a specific identity carries
difficulties as well, as building crucial alliances may be more challenging. To that end, the
Zapatista movement has balanced an essentialized Indigenous identity with a more universalized
struggle, while the Ecuadorian movement has sought to blend Indigenous and class-based issues
into its overall framing. A broader identity construction has helped the Zapatista movement gain
transnational attention and support, although it remains unclear whether this international boost
has actually advanced Zapatista goals. Overall, Indigeneity has been constructed as both unique
and inclusive in order to cultivate unity among groups, garner transnational support, and redefine
an identity that has so long been cast aside. The reclamation of Indigeneity as the foundation of
these movements marks a crucial turning point in how these communities envision themselves
and their place in the world.
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Conclusion
Power in Unlikely Circumstances
When I visited Chiapas, Mexico to gain a broader perspective of the Zapatista movement,
I found myself wandering around the Centro Indígena de Capacitación Integral (Indigenous
Center for Comprehensive Training, CIDECI), one of the Zapatista’s largest and most extensive
autonomous schools. CIDECI is something like a communally-minded trade school, where
students live on campus and are responsible for maintaining the school. Students take elective
classes ranging from carpentry to bread baking to literacy, and the work produced from these
classes contributes to the school in some way. As one of the students gave me a tour around the
center, I couldn’t help but admire the extensive farm and the beautiful artwork that these students
had helped create. It was a unique space. And yet this semi-remote school did not exist in total
isolation: the municipal government frequently tried to undermine the Zapatista’s legitimacy by
cutting its power and water supplies. Even when asserting their autonomy, these communities
must reckon with what it means to live under nation-states and navigate spaces for power in
systems that do not always see Indigenous people as equal.
This study began with a comparison of two contemporary social movements that
transcend the bounds of how we traditionally conceptualize collective action. Both movements
express themselves under an Indigenous identity, strive for greater autonomy, and face states that
not only have historically excluded them, but also presently provide few options for these groups
to gain political voice. While the movements use similar rhetoric emphasizing their
marginalization, unique worldview, peasant status, and rights to land in order to gain greater
autonomy, their strategies for gaining greater autonomy have differed. Tribes in Ecuador have
sought increased political participation, only recently turning towards the politics of refusal in
intellectual debates and greater focus on community development. Zapatista communities,
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however, pursued refusal from the early stages of the movement, both to assert a principle of
Indigenous power and to push for a reconceptualization of the nation-state system.
These diverging tactics cannot merely be explained by differing political opportunities.
While there are of course slight variations between political systems in Ecuador and Mexico,
both states are relatively closed systems with high levels of corruption, lack of free and fair
elections, limited expression and organization, lack of separation between the executive and
other aspects of the state, and a high capacity for coercion. Rather, Indigenous Ecuadorians did
not directly refuse state structures because they were able to obtain at least partial concessions by
pursuing disruptive tactics and political participation, such as a pluriethnic and later plurinational
constitution. The fact that the Ecuadorian movement involved coordinated pressure from
Indigenous groups across the country, not just from one area, can explain these partial triumphs.
Such widespread coordination was made possible by Ecuador’s higher population of Indigenous
people (that could have a greater electoral impact) as well as the organizational networks
between Ecuadorian groups built over decades.
The Zapatistas, on the other hand, faced greater opposition from the state. With the
state’s failure to implement the San Andrés Accords, the Zapatistas began to articulate a
complete lack of confidence in the government. The politics of refusal thus arose as the primary
tactic once negotiations with the state failed. While the Zapatistas certainly gained attention from
the state with their disruptive tactics, they could more easily be ignored or even repressed with
force (as in the Acteal Massacre), due to the regional nature of the movement. Transnational
alliances certainly amplified the Zapatista cause; however, the Zapatistas did not construct this
transnational network until after they had already refused the state. The politics of refusal thus
arose out of a situation where both disruptive campaigns and negotiations with the state failed.
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While these failures prompted the politics of refusal, it was ultimately their articulation of a
unique identity with a claim to sovereignty and their broad system of transnational alliances that
has allowed the Zapatista’s strategy to continue to the present.
The Indigenous identities behind both movements also add to the unique nature of these
instances of collective action. While Indigeneity evolved out of “Indianness,” a concept
originally constructed by colonialist forces and perpetuated by the state, activists in these cases
have redefined the identity, choosing which aspects of this amorphous category to emphasize.
Because the movements engaged with identity in ways that were both expressive and
instrumental, the role of identity goes beyond simple framing processes. Identity was certainly
framed in a particular light at times for strategic value, but in the expressive aspects of the
movement, identity was the goal rather than a strategic tool. Identity was expressive in the sense
that both movements involved reshaping negative perceptions of Indigeneity and replacing these
associations with images of Indigenous power. Both movements, however, also used identity
instrumentally. The construction of a more essentialized identity based around marginalization,
poverty, unique worldviews, peasant livelihoods, and being the first inhabitants of specific lands,
had two specific purposes. First, in both cases, essentialized Indigeneity legitimized groups’
claims to land, education, cultural rights and overall autonomy– not necessarily in the eyes of the
state, but for the movement communities themselves. Secondly, in a similar but more extreme
vein, essentialized identity legitimized the politics of refusal for the Zapatistas, since building a
new system must have some ideological base.
However, an essentialized Indigenous identity in both movements had to be balanced
against other goals. In the Ecuadorian case, narrowing the definition of Indigeneity too much
might exclude some regional groups and counteract the crucial coalition-building occurring
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between tribes across the nation. To work around this tension, CONAIE sought to articulate
Indigeneity as broader term that would include everyone from highland to coastal groups, while
preserving the structures of regional organizations as spaces for local identities. The Zapatistas,
however, had to balance emphasizing their uniqueness as Indigenous people with accentuating
the universal nature of their struggle in order to build crucial transnational alliances.
Essentializing identity was more critical in the Zapatista case because of the need to legitimize
refusal. Therefore, the Zapatistas sought to maintain their essentialized Indigenous identity while
expressing their overall ideology as part of a broader human rights struggle in order to appeal to
transnational groups. These tensions over how to strategically frame identity highlight the
difficult nature of identity construction for groups that have been extremely marginalized.

Theoretical Implications:
This analysis of the tactics and identity construction behind the Zapatista and Ecuadorian
Indigenous movements suggests general implications for how we understand Indigenous
movements in the context of social movement theory. By examining these cases through the
more macro lens of social movement theory, we gain greater insight into how the groups
navigate relations with the state. An exploration of Indigenous movements, however, would not
be complete without the more anthropological realm of identity. As these two perspectives
merge, we see that the politics of refusal, identity, and transnational support all interact in
complex ways that cannot be explained by a strictly structural approach. Transnational support
allowed for the politics of refusal in the Zapatista case, since the state violence and coercion that
occurred once negotiations subsided could only be mitigated through outside attention. However,
this transnational support has also shaped the identity of the movement, as the Zapatistas have
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inevitably had to represent their identity to appeal to this transnational network. Although the
Ecuadorian movement has not explicitly appealed to transnational groups, they have become part
of the pan-American Indigenous movement, which has molded the movement as well. This
relation with pan-American Indigenous thinkers is perhaps what prompted Ecuadorian activists
towards adopting a discourse related to the politics of refusal. Identity has also shaped the nature
of refusal and transnational support. As mentioned, an essentialized Indigenous identity
legitimized the politics of refusal, while a broader articulation of identity appealed to
transnational audiences. Thus, identity, transnational support, and the politics of refusal do not
exist in isolation, but rather overlap. In this manner, movements are not purely the result of
external factors, but rather they play a substantial role in creating new, powerful identities and
tactics.
Scholars who focus primarily on institutional factors for movement emergence and
development do not usually capture the agency that movements maintain over their tactics and
identities. The political opportunity structure maintains that movements evolve and emerge based
on shifting opportunities and constraints within the political system. When structures change
such that a new way of addressing the state or a new potential for organization occurs, collective
action can be the result. This state-centric view, however, does not take into account the
constructed identities of a movement or changing ethnic consciousness. In particular, it does not
consider how groups that have been historically and presently excluded from political
opportunities may still conjure up alternative means of organizing. In the case of these
Indigenous movements, groups faced a general lack of resources, many political constraints, and
immensely limited opportunities. However, the Ecuadorian case still managed some political
participation and a few limited (if only symbolic) steps towards a more inclusive system. The
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Zapatistas even transcended the political opportunity structure by focusing on creating
autonomous systems. These counter-intuitive results can only be understood when we account
for the agency of the movement.
It was not the political opportunity structure that allowed for these unlikely actions, but
rather these gains occurred in spite of the political hand communities were dealt. The political
opportunity structure did play small role, since differing party systems and political and civil
rights granted Ecuadorian Indigenous groups more success with political participation. However,
it is not the primary explanatory factor. Furthermore, it does not explain why these movements
emerged despite the repressive systems they faced, particularly in their treatment of Indigenous
people. Rather than opportunities spurring action and constraints limiting them, Indigenous
groups managed collective action under considerable constraints.
The theoretical insight of this work is therefore to demonstrate the need to expand beyond
narrow, separate frameworks (such as the political opportunity structure, resource mobilization,
and framing) to consider both how such factors do not exist in isolation but instead interact in
complicated ways. In certain cases, these social movement frameworks provide the backdrop for
the construction of identities that turn out to be powerful resources for the movement. When a
movement is both about gaining specific policy concessions and asserting particular identities,
identity, social movement theory, and the agency of the movement should form the basis of any
comprehensive analysis. As Goodwin et al. put it, we must “recognize that cultural and strategic
processes define and create the factors usually presented as ‘structural’” (1999, 52).
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Further Questions:
This work does not seek to develop set laws for when certain social movements might
arise or to test particular hypotheses. Rather, I sought to explore why and how these highly
marginalized groups with a unique Indigenous identity were able to shake the very core of the
nation-state system and redefine Indigenous power. What does this confrontation of current
power structures mean for the communities involved in the future? Certainly, these movements,
aimed at more than procedural or substantive gains, have brought Indigenous voices to the
national stage in a manner that the state could not ignore. However, when movements
simultaneously aim to express a particular identity and gain substantive changes from the state,
as in these cases, is there a trade-off? Does identity politics– which often necessitate significant
work within the community– distract from more structural changes– which require greater
engagement with the state and other allies? There is no clear answer to this question, but
certainly tensions exist between asserting an identity or ideology and the practical nature of
making change. The Zapatista autonomous schools, for instance, may be spaces for reclaiming
Indigenous identity and autonomy, but they are not state-recognized and thus Indigenous people
who attend them cannot go on to Mexican universities. The Zapatistas want to assert an anticonsumerist, anti-capitalism ideology, but they rely on the sales of artwork and artisan coffee to
support their cause. CONAIE seeks to assert Indigenous power through coalition building across
tribes, but so many heterogeneous voices may simultaneously complicate moving forward on
specific goals.
Perhaps the politics of refusal transcends this tension between identity expression and
policy advances by disregarding policy as the main target. When the tactic is to carve out spaces
within the community for Indigenous identities and gain more autonomy over one’s affairs,
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maybe identity is supported while communities achieve certain goals (such as land rights or
multicultural education). Even if this is so, sustaining these autonomous systems is exceedingly
difficult, especially when the state is intent on dismantling them. Not only are finances and
resources a question, but communities must also constantly negotiate what it means to exist
inside a state and maintain autonomy without seceding. Furthermore, since the Zapatistas
criticize the neoliberal nation-state structure as a whole, their alternative is a nebulous system
where all groups are included and Indigenous cultures are fully valued. It remains unclear what
such a system might look like or how it may come about. What is clear is that the Zapatistas–
and increasingly Indigenous Ecuadorians– do not perceive the current state system as a structure
that could ever fully meet their needs.
The tension between identity politics and practical changes highlights another question: is
movement leadership always aligned with the communities involved? In terms of identity, what
does it mean for a mestizo man such as Subcomandante Marcos to lead a movement that
represents Indigenous power? Is some of the expressive power of the movement lost?
Additionally, a paradox of leadership means that in order to spend time meeting with state
representatives or traveling to meet with leftist groups, even Indigenous leaders may become
increasingly disconnected from the people they represent. In his ethnography of Randy Borman,
a white leader of Ecuador’s Cofán people (but who was raised among the Cofán), Michael Cepek
explores this dilemma. He notes, Borman’s “time in Quito creates a great political irony: the bulk
of his life is consumed by working to protect something that he can no longer enjoy” (2012,
118).
I would add that Borman’s time spent fighting for environmental protections on Cofán
land moves him further from direct contact with those he represents, yet he retains ample power
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over the interpretation of Cofán goals. As with many Indigenous movements, there may be an
issue of translation, as the political intricacies of the Ecuadorian state might be culturally foreign
to Cofán members who have not spent much time outside of the Amazon. However, the potential
disconnect between leaders (who translate between Indigenous people and the dominant culture)
and the communities that hold the actual grievances may be significant. While leadership is
necessary for practical changes (especially leaders that can navigate the dominant culture), it is
crucial to evaluate their ties to the communities and their motivations for involvement. In the
Zapatista and Ecuadorian cases, the wide array of leadership (including women, men, Indigenous
and non-Indigenous) may mitigate this disconnect. To some degree, however, it remains an
inevitable consequence of mediating between cultures.
The push for autonomy and self-determination by Indigenous groups around the world
raises important questions about how communities can pursue this goal and how states can best
navigate groups’ demands. While there is certainly no one way to manage this tension, this
analysis has highlighted how constructing a movement as both a human rights and identity
struggle can legitimize claims to a special status. States should recognize self-determination as a
special path to an equal status, considering the impact of prior marginalization on Indigenous
groups. If we are to have systems that fully value the unique identities and circumstances of
Indigenous people, these programs must be primarily self-generated. Self-determination is the
first step in this essential process.
Indigenous movements offer a unique lens for analyzing contemporary social
movements. They ask the question, how do marginalized, resource-poor groups that organize
themselves around a specific identity, and are excluded on the basis of this identity, gain political
influence? Despite differences from country to country, the key first step is to construct an
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identity that creates a widespread coalition, bringing together groups that otherwise might not see
themselves as so similar. A widespread network of support, whether transnational or domestic,
helps augment the power created by coalition building. The expanded pressure created from
these two developments, however, does not determine how the state will react. The politics of
refusal as a means to gain attention and support, claim autonomy and redefine the power of a
marginalized identity may be a growing trend in these circumstances. Even movements such as
Black Lives Matter in the U.S. have articulated community building rather than appealing to
existing power structures as their focus going forward (Yates 2016). In a situation where
appealing to existing power structures and looking for avenues within the political system has
been the norm, it makes sense that uniquely marginalized groups would look for alternative
methods. Rather than placing the power in the hands of the state by seeking increased
involvement or recognition, the trend may be shifting towards fashioning one’s own power. This
power grows from a particular identity, but ultimately revolves around seeking a more just world
that values the uniqueness of all.
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